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Since the end of the Allied occupation in April, 1952,
Japan has grom economically to take a current position as the
world 'o third largest producer (the U. S«, Soviet Union and
Japan, in that order)* Its continuous real economic growth
rate of 10.1 percent (since 1954) is unparalleled in history
and the implications of this, and other factors, make Japan
uw v vliij U- i. O . . ill .l. ij. c* U i. vi &UlS.UUJil.JtQ IJ \jmyc t,<-L OUJ, , UUt cl ^lUtitfi'iUi
political and social force in Asia now with an even more
powerful potential for the future. Tha objective of this
study, then, :.s to examine one of the salient economic fact
which has materially contributed to Japan's becoming cuch a
dynamic and competitive nation, i.e< ? the major busint s
groups.
Historically, overwhelming predominance in finance,
Industry and -rade was held by four hu^e business groupingo
:
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Uasuda. These and other
groups not nearly as large or as powerful, were known
collectively and individually by the Japanese term "zalbatsu .
"
The importance of these organizations to Japan as a whole
succinctly expressed by the four- time prime Minister, loshidi

2Shigeru, who, shortly after the start of the occupation, said
that "the nation's economic structure had been built by such
old established and major financial concerns . . . , and that
modern Japan owed her prosperity to their endeavors . " Based
upon the same pattern of thought that Xoshida verbalized, the
political-economic experts of the Allied powers generally felt
that the zaiba tsu were largely responsible for Japan's
aggression and, as a result, occupation authorities were
directed to dissolve them. However, despite dissolution effox-'s
these major groupings, by name, still exist today.
Thus, given a background of the tremendous influence
of the big business concerns, the research question to be
answered is, "Is the zaibatsu system, per se, still operative
in Japan, and. if not;, what has replaced it?" in formula "fei-n-'"'
an answer, other questions which have aaterialized are:
(1) What, in reality, is the zaibatsu. how did
it develop, and what are its salieat organizational
and financial features?
(2) What are the social, political and economic
conditions and philosophies both b3fore and after
the occupation which affected the saibatsu?
It is hoped that the answers t> these questions through
the study of the zaibatsni with their interrelated economic,
political and social relationships, will assist in gaining a
better understanding of the nature and significance of large
Japanese business groups both in the historical and the current
sense.
•^The quotation has been extracted from the text of
loshlda's entire statement as presented in Eleanor M. Hadley,






The scope of research for this thesis has been limited
by several factors. First, due to the author's inability to
read either Japanese ideographic script (kanji ) or the t
current syllabaries (katakana and hlrareana ) . source data h
been necessarily reduced to those publications in .English or
to translations of Japanese works by other persons. By this
res trie tion, ituch valuable information may have been loi
although a ra ;her extensive bibliography in English has been
developed.
The sucond ma 3 or limitation to the scope of thic thesis
is the inconsistency found in Japanese financial data. Fo
many years, Japanese business concerns were either not
information, Not until the late 1950s or early 1960s were data
published where comparisons could be clrawn with Western
businesses. However, in that the Japaiese still do not
subscribe to full disclosure and other accounting conventions
familiar to the United States, the majority of this recently
published material must be viewed as suspect by our sta; ds.
Since a comparative analysis of derived figures was not
possible, Japanese financial and other data, as presented by
various sources, has been accepted without dispute. Where it
is Important, however, sourc nd/or conflicts in info: Loa
have been fully annotated.

4Organization ana Mechanical Details.
In the writing of this study, the Japanese practice of
giving the family name first has been observed where the names
appear in the text. References to authors both in the? foot-
notes and in the bibliography have followed the standard
Western technique of family name last. In addition, because
so many Japanese terms and organizational names have been us'<
a glossary of these has been added as Appendix I to facilitate
identification.
The thesis has been organized in a fashion to permit a
topical approach within a chronological framework. An attempt
has been made to maintain historical perspective throughout all
the chapters,
of large Japanese business groups and to provide a conceptual
framework fron which to expand, Chapter II ex; ines the ^pacirl
ownership, financial and structural characteristics of those
organizations known as zalbatsu .
The third and fourth chapters letail the historical
evolution f bo th ma;Jor and minor zalbatsu fron inception In
the early seventeenth century through dissolution subsequent
to World War II. The primary purpose of these chapters is to
follow the prcgreas of zail .... upings through periods of
internal and external maturation and to study, in some detail,
their relationship to Japanese political and economic dynamics.

5Because the Allied conception of these relationships shaped
occupation policy, much emphasis will be placed on actual
zalbatsu involvement with the military-political complex
during the 19."50s and the war years. The enactment of programs
to democratize the public and private sectors is studied with
a view toward the development of a new framework for the
economy and for the emergence of Japan as a world economic
power.
The yjars following the termination of the occupation
brought forth a new Japan with a viable and modern economy.
In conjunction with the expanding economy came changes in the
large business groups and the dynamics of these changes, as
well as their relationship to the older zalbatsu organization
and control techniques, are examined closely in Chapter V,
Based upon thn facts thereby presented, Chapter VI draws a
conclusion as to the lasting effects of the occupation refc.
programs In terms of both the existence of the zalbatsu t \




Justice Holmes once observed:
A word is not crystal, transparent and
unchanged . It is the slcin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used.*
The tfjrm "za ibatsu" takes this form in that it means
different things to different people, at different times within
Japan as well as among authorities outside the country,
discussion of the term's various definitions is necessary in
prtiftr t.o pstAiiTish Bonie reference ^oint froK which to ins
the. significance of the "zaibatsu .
"
The most simplistic view of zaibatsu is found in a
dictionary whore it is defined as "a financial combinc=group;
a money (=financial) clique; big business; the plutocracy; a
giant family -irust; a family holding company; a big buslness-
man." Ftymologically, the word is a derivation of zai (money--
wealth; richef!~-a fortune; assets—-property) and bat-gu (a
clique? a faction; a clan).-5 In commo:i Japanese usage,
^Tovrne v, Eisner, 215 U.S. 418 (1917).
^Senkichiro Katsu .. ed., Ke:ifc?usha' -
EngliBh
i:
Pic tlp-nt Cokyo: Kenkyu Ltd., 1954), p. ,
6

7zaibatsu has become both a collective noun used as a "virtual
synonym for a group of combines""" and a term to identify an
2individual combine as well.
Whereas the above definitions provide some insight ap
to the general meaning of zaibatsu . they have not developed
its special characteristics and it is within this area that,
perhaps j the greatest semantic difficulty occurs. One popular
school of thought is that a member of the zaibatsu must be
imbued with the following:
(1) Snmifeudal characteristics in that
centralized control rests in a , . . family
which extends its power through strategically
arranged marriages and other knight-vassal
(dedication) relationships.
(2) Well-knit, tightly controlled relation-
ships among affiliated firms by means of holding
companies) interlocking directorships, and
mutual s fcoclrtiol d 1 tksrs .
form of commercial ban!: credit, which is used as
the central leverage to extend control in all
industries .5
On the other hand, some authors equate zaiV ' to "a
lay term referring to the political payer deriving from great
wealth, Thi.s definition falls into line with similar
Japanese terms such as kambatsu (official clique or bureau-
5
cracy) and ^ucibatsu (military clique q:: militarists) both of
Eleanor M. Eadley, "Concentrated Business Power in
Japan," (unpublished Ph. D, dissertation, Badcliffe College,
1949), p. 3.
-*Kozo Yamamura, Economic Policy in Postwar -n
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 19&T), "pp.1 10-1'
Hadley, Business Power ,, p. 5.
5 T . A . Bi s
a
on t 2a 1batau 3 ion. In Japan ( B erk e 1ey
:
University of California Press, 1954), p. 1.

8which are politically oriented terminology.
By use of these perimeters, it is not necessary to
include family management as an essential concept. It is,
however, necessary to trace the pattern emerging from the
generalized term "great wealth" to the specific type of
enterprise "combines" as opposed to other types of business
organizations such as trusts, cartels, etc. The rationale
developed for this equation is derived from the fact that since
wealth is a product of concentrated business, and the mechanism
of the combine was consistently used b/ the Japanese for this
purpose, the, term "zalbatsu" has indirectly come into use to
describe ccabJnes, 1
The theory of the involvement and power of large
Japanese business groups in the political aent.or has been
supported by many authors. G. C. Allen, speaking of the period
prior to the Sino»Japanese War of 1937, stated:
• • • The advocates of junsen.* !2 strengthened
their position. Moreover, the immense expenditure
on armaments and the fostering of Industries of
strategic importance led to the rise of powerful
business groups whose fortunes were bound up with
the continuance of these policies. These groups
were referred to as the "New Zalbatsu. "3
This concept of ties between large Japanese business groups and
the political structure has even been extended to the local
^-Hadley, Busino s s _Povgr
f p. 3.
2A contraction of junsenji kel*ai which is defined as
a (juasi-wartima economy.
3George C c Allen, Ji o
.
Industry; Its R ft n ft r>t.£Q^^2a|n^anl^esent Oon^U^^^Tf^T^lI^tl^troi:
Paciiic delations, 1940 ), p. 16.

9level. In his study of the Ohara zaj-batsu in Okayama Prefecture,
James A. Kokoris stated that within the Prefecture "elections
to the Diet were influenced by Ohara and his supporters."
The face of zalbatsu then is like that of a diamond; it
n«.« many facets which require that a joint of focus be found
that ties the various concepts together. In research so far
conducted* thare appears to be only ore point of universal
agreement or consensus among all authors. It is that the Mitsui;,
Mitsubishi, Sinai tomo and Xasuda combine s were, in fact, zaibatsu.
Subsequent to this point of agreement the definition
has become diffused as witnessed by the following:
But i:i Japanese usage, not all combines are
zalbatsu . In the vocabulary of many Japanese, only
faiaily-doiiinated. combines are zaj^bajfcsu, though
frequently such persons do not consistently abide
by their own usage* xhe members of the (Japanese)
Holding Company Liquidation Commission . . .
maintained this view (that of family domination)
but then proceeded to name Nissan as one of the ten
designated zalbatsu . . . even though Nissan at no
point had been family dominated.^
The decision then as to which ousinesses can enjoy the
term zry u. is largely arbitrary. Bacause of common conceptual
agreement, scope cf operations, explicLt political power patter
efficient/effective control mechanisms and similarities to other
combine structures, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda
will, for the purposes of this thesis, be considered as
James A. Kokoris, "The Ohara ISaibatsu of Okayama, " in
The Occasional Papers (No . 8) of the Center
Studleg , ed. by Iiichard K. Beardsley (Ann Arbor: The ersity
of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 55.
2Hadley, Antitrust , pp. 20-21.
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exemplifying the zaibatsu although they are not, by any means,
the only groups that constituted zaibajtsu concentrations. To
illustrate this point, although incomplete, Table 1 details
business groups that were commonly referred to as zaibatsu
through a period subsequent to World bar II.
Organization and Structure of Zaibatsu Companies
As wao previously mentioned, zaibatru companies were
primarily organized along the lines of a combine (a grouping
of companies with a single or limited ownership base and a
unified business strategy), but certain unique characteristics
differentiated these from the generally accepted Western
version of suoh a structure. At the tDp of the combine, there
was a honsha (head company) or honz ensaa (family company as in
the case of Y&suda) which might be internally organized as a
partnership or as a limited liability company, but which was
dominated by the founding family. Externally the honnha was a
holding company whose existence was derived from the control of
other companies.
The capital of the honsha was (subscribed by the founding
family » which also maintained interests (either controlling or
non-controllirg) in selected subsidiaries. The major
subsidiaries took various forms; some were straight industrial
organizations (either with or without limited investments)
while others were holding companies themselves. These














































aZalbatsu persons as designated by the HCLC lor
divestiture of stock and working restrictions (sec Chapter
"Iwasaki Families.
Actually in the Purukawa family circle by marriage,
but listed separately by the HCLC.
Source: Combined by the vrriter from all appropriate




types: first, the "pure" variety which was non-operating in
that it was organized solely for the purpose of investing
capital in the stocks of other companies and by doing so,
either directly or indirectly, controlled these organizations;
second, the "mixed" type which was itself an operating
company. Thus, a chain style financial complex was developed
where families had controlling amounts of stock in the honeha .
who in turn hold large blocks of stocks in subsidiaries to
which were added the direct stock holdings by the families > as
well as "crosn ownership holdings between subsidiaries.""
Indicative of this type of control pattern was the information
submitted by the Mitsui combine to the Supreme Commander for






Top holding company 1
Designated subsidiaries ("first
line" and "second line") of
the top holc.ing company. 22
Subsidiaries of the designated
subsidiaries; except Trading
& Mining 81
Subsidiaries cf Mitsui Trading 60
Subsidiaries of Mitsui Mining 31
^Definitions of "pure" and "mixed" holding compi
were derived from the > .^cyclopedic Dictionary of Business (
York: Prentice -Hall, Inc
.
, 1952), p. 3oo7"
2Hadley, Aj^jrrug;t, p. 28.
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Description Number of Companies
Ordinary subsidiaries of the top
holding company 50
Subsidiaries of the ordinary
subsidiaries of the top
holding company 27
Total 272
Charts I, II, III and IV illustrate the entire
organizational structure and internal financial ties of the
Mitsui, Mitsubichi, Sumitomo, and lasuda zalbatsu.
respectively, in 1946.
Although shares in various hQJjsha were offered for
public sale, the ownership base was net widely distributed
beyond the fanily and the companies it controlled (Table 2).
Outside owners were mainly top executive personnel of the
^SuLfel!u^jd» some high echelon government officials, and members
of the imperial household.
Decisions concerning business policy were made in
family councils, and the honsha dicta t3d these policies to the
subsidiaries, family councils also appointed key honsha
personnel, and. strong kinship ties (although some of them were
ceremonip.l anc. fictitious) more than stock ownership, kept the
combine a tightly unified organization. Due to traditional
Japanese concepts of superior-inferior relationships within
the social framework and kazoku seldo (family system), the
family demanded and received loyalty and obligation throughout
the complex hierarchy of the combine which served as a primary
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W.6$ WW !JI CCiSWISl 3KIP (I 15,030,000)
14.6^ l«L I B-m^iU? (» 6,100,000)
31JS CSta HOTT 1*5(0 TET (* 2,0O0;0CO)
66$ CWK-J £ZL\-ri23S BTISL TASlUCtriOTI C< 180,000)
66$ tAUf^ UreaffilAl C0KEtJ3?I0S It 300,000)
B2.e$ ratrai SLWiroaA-a ihd'^sit (i 400,000)









FCBflUARV 46 GHQ "SCAP NUMBER 48

MA*aiwu» optical ikd. ix- 2,000,000)
fQSTQ HATCH C. . ITO. (I 1,090,000)
UIHO 1-ltCML-illLI CO. (X 200,000)
ATiiil UTAH IH^H CO. (I 1.200,000)
TCCTO HOW MIt»L WUH13 I* 6.000,000)
1ITU MACHIM r-' 1J MO. Ill, i.OOO]
HOU KACII1BI 50., LTD. [t 190,000)
III MOID 1HCTRIC «<JU3 (* l.UtAJ.lVUJ





I MITSUBISHI THADIW (I
100,000,000-)
CHV3IA MITSUBISHI MACHISTS TOOL (I 20,000,000)
V 6 * HITSUBISKI STLAKiBIP {J
70.O.O.COQ)
I » > IWI MDUSTRIU. (I l.OCO.OOO; f
|j ,...'*.->.. ru r„. K.. inv«»Mi>n af !• Ihu 10*
I 100,000,000
X 20,000,000
19 53* JAFAB MABJSH^OSS CCBTRCL 00. (I 20,000,
OOO)
ialee* coaia tARsH'.ass aaifPUio, ltd. (x to.oco)
(HltwiUtHl *ar«houii« hnt lnT«»tn»ot» of l««i th*n
lp* U 20 o|h»f ctwp*nlfl« xhlch »r. not ll»toi hers.
4 MITSUBISHI HISIKO (X .107, -too, 000)
* MITSUBISHI TRaCISO (X 100,000,000)
£ MITSUBISHI bXM (X 135,000,000)
L_J
6;S TOTtO HAXABO BAiX (X 625,000)
tOOS TCai CO., LTD. (J 60.000)
ICO* TtiBJJ LTO, CO. (I 600,000)
13* TOZCEilU X03HIB BA'tt (X 600,000)
13* 70A COCOSOIAI LSTXLLIOll'Cl EUB3AU (I 500,000)
1« lAfllOO L*S3 (X 92.7SO,000)




? 4 MIT3&ISHI HOHSHA (J 240,000,000)
i 7 it JUSTSniSa: KXAYT IKDUSTBt (X 1,000,000.000)
G 7 i MITSUBISHI TRUST (X 30,000,000)
! i
v, 2 J TOKYO HAHIJit 4 ?IhB Ib'SUBAJICS (I 80,000,000)
10.0 * rUJI Lire ••J-^yg {x_?.too,coo )
J
15? JAPAS OTESIl EST TEC3T CO, (X 1,000,000)
jM«M Truis C 0., ltd. ha* lnToctsoUt of
lata tfcu 10* In 4 Jthjr cearialos which aro no!
litte 1 hora .)
I
'"
6 J MITSUBISHI HCKSSA (X 240,000.000)
7 * MITSUBISHI EZAYT ISWSTHT (X 1,000,000,000)
6 * MITSUBISHI MIWISO IX 407,400,000)
1 * MITSUBISHI TZlADISO (X 100,000,000)
> i MITSUBISHI BASK. (X 135.000.000)
S * MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC (I IK), 000, 000)
1 J MITSUBISHI ISTATJ (X 18,500,000)
I * MITSUBISHI CK2HICJU, (X 110,790,000)
I * MITSUBISHI STZIL (X 100,000,000)
* HIPPOS ALCMIKUM (J 60,000,000)
< JAPAS OPTICAL ISEUSTHT (X £0,000,000)
I lorto mariss abd nas issvax-scs (* bo, 000,000)







v,.',i uruai nax ebici co. (z eoo.ooo)
ce< rcExcem dock 4 ocsstBUCsicai co. (t 6,000,000)
Ui UUiUVl HSTAU (PItE) UD. CO. (X 800,000)
eo-4 nAtttua mca woKifl ti 3.000,000)
t-X HIBOSSDU CABtDO 1ST). CO. (I 190,000)
fli ituaaj MACaUH TCOJ CO. (J l.OOO.COO)
3--i lEBiil 1TTOM0BILS HTC. CO. (J 16,000,000)
"I >.u;riATT KM. CO. (* 6,000,000)
BOt >:T8C3ISD1 IDCaWT L'JXKtH (» 1,600,000)
X-* 1XPI2I1L APC£LK CO. (J 8,000,000)
•.j i3ca rar»s icra. co. (« 3.000.000)
;:* DiiesL coisxciiw co. (1 9,000.000)
:: UCS KOI3 {I 1,200,000)
31* dCRXV MM. {X 5,700,000)
ES I5tU KUTT-IED. CO. (X 11.000,000)
2.1 KJ-J4.IC DBT PUT8 IKD. CO. (r 1,000,000)
XTi SBCI K4CHIM WO. CO. (X 1,000,000)
1'i J1PX3 HLTTI3T CO. (I 20,000.000)
t aro. co, (3 7,000,000)
ro, (x l.ooo.oco)
&] tiNB & jkcacpuire (x 3,600,000)
IC-t ALE CEWIClL IUD. (X 1, £00,000)
k.-i .'APJJ MACUlin 1ID. (KICTCLJ) [X 40.000,000)




70.0 « liL-Xi FXHV. CO. II 300,000)
63. 00 ]t tc^ax iiri:7:,r.-ai (x coo.oco)
;zu rcris i^iicrLrjfix co. has lKY*snaa,Ts
is Tvxrr-ir-.T: cacisics Xv/r listid)
3B.67 i K1T4OTS3I i*.tirXKlU3 (X 10,7*8,000)
(1KB K1T3ISJS3I PAJ7J<JiIlJS HAS Il^'ESTiUBTS
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01 $ K1TSUBISHI H0Mi3i (( 210,000,000)
003)t MITSUBISai KiA'.r I7.U!STEr (X 1,000,000)
2 $ MITSUBISHI TaAlIli'O (S 3,000,000)
i pjji unwsrauj. f*' l.ooo.oco)
* MITSUBISHI CESMCAL ISDUSTEUL HAC3. (X 20,600,0'
$ MITSUBISHI KAJISSITj-M IKWSTST (X 6,000,000)
% MITSUBISHI IVAJ'OrUd'O MTO, (X 16.000,000)












MilSOBISHI NIS'I.T, IX 407,40*. 000)
MITSUBISHI TBADISO (X 100,000,000)
HIISUBISHI StSKL (X 100,000,000)
MAJtCmraiAB MITSUBISHI MACRIU1 1.000,000} U
,. -co, 000)
KITSWaiSBI CeXMlCAL ISru^rRIXL KaCH. (X 20,6C*3,COO)l
lAXBIDO EUBfiXH CC. LTD. (X 1,150,000)
A3AUI CU33 SALES CO., LTD. Vi 2,600,000)
3HA0 HiO CUSS CC, (X 4,600,000)
nOBI EBADIWG CO., LTD. IX 160,000)
IIPPOH CAHBOSIC ACID ISD. CO. {% 124,000)
LIC3 0!I. & **31S CO., LTD. [X 3,500,000)
KAHCauaiA 8CJDA OO., LTD. (X 18,260,0CO)
TCTO 0EIHD3TCS1C ITD. CO.. LTD. (X 1,000 ,000)
SODA CSjyiCAL WHO C037H0L CO. {X 2,000,000)
SIPPCU PLATS OUl IS 00., LTD. (I 12.260,000)
HU8E&) CHXKICA4. :j.-0. CO. (X 2,3£0,000)
IOKAI IKDOSTBI C~i., I.ID. (OLAflS) (X 1,000, COO)
IXJH1AH PLATS OLA33 2a1.S3 CO. (X 600,000)
KJIO CARD03 CO., (X 3,000,000) '
TAEXDA ChlMICAL tDEiD) CO., LTD. (X 9 t 0f.O.0CO)
CHJMICAL 1SD. (X 2,600,000)
UB CO., j_ro. (» ft.ECO.OCO lyo«i)
S CiOHICAL IhD. CO. II 30, 000.
C
BlfKM pUBJ DB003 CO.. VtO,'{t 500,000)
jutlthl Chi*uicul Inrt. Ltd. has lnve*tamt* of !•<•



















.04 •). MITSUilSMI SCESHA (X 340,000.000)
l.7 t MITSbllShil Hi-.'iT IVLUSTftJ U 1,000,000)
.7 $ hiTsiraisai Ti^ij.;j [x 100,000,000)
5 i kAA'CHUaiAi' hITSUSlSBI Ij^HIHS TOOL (X 20. 000,
t
2 * MITSUBISHI CKEhlCU IIOJ. MAC H 11.131 (X 20, SCO,
(
$ lilPPOK AhC>il?iCr:(<Al STtCL (X 20,000,000)
£ JAPaH GKICAL IKDUSTRI (X 60,05D.L>33)




1. CCUPAHIB3 LISTHJ IH 50L10 DOXBa AEj", 3JB3IDIAXL33 oHOSit D'JttCI COVtlOt . fji p^hCIT
H'jLOIMt; C0W7AVT 03 VB:*£K ClKTKOL 0? SUD3IDIAi(183 Of r"j; PAassr UOLODl
2, COHl'lHIBS LIdTE3 IH DA3H BOJtr.3 ABJt COUPAJIIBS IH niCH THii IBAi I ' '
MITSL'BISHI IWW8(U OB IT3 S'JB3IDlyJil23 HAVE IH'/li3TUi!IT3.
1. 311OT LHfTED IH TBI SHOU PAID-UP CAPJfit..
4. pF«';arAi.J S irw TJS AJIJ-MT OF 3T0C1 :(3LD 8T U1TSU9I3HI CuSCUHK,
s. c,ut*im jaiuj-oh;*MT ckjoj -iC'U>n.'us aucso avuaiDiAHiM aki hot 3,o«.
SOURCE- MITSUBISHI H0N3HA
HIIFtS COBALT KUtlHO l» f-CO.OOO)
KOSIAJ/ CtSTHAL UJKTR1C RTO. (X 400,000)
TASUSAVA AIBCBAJT RLSCTBIC CC. (J 10,000,000)
KAKAHO CCPPKR tlHl '.Cfc>3 LTD. (X 375.0COJ
HIKAEU .-EECISX KACKIXXSX it 1^3,750,000)
TOTC BLSCTHIC CO. (H 2,000,000)
HIWO kliCTlvJC WQHBS ITD. (X 1.600,000)
BYOSAH KLU1 CMC, kCHlS ITD. (X l.cXi.OOO)
Totro ALtCHArr naiHucon co. (i 3,000,000)
TSUDA wUJi K». ZO. (I 760.000)
TOXIC BEBE VCEX3 LTD. (I 300, COC)
•umix ALicEAJT urj'MUoaiT (x 10.000,000)
TEBAUCHI wcaifl LTD. (X 3,600,000)
BHIEOIXBA Xl^CTBIC VCHtiJ (I 1 ,000.000)
BICSrIO ILSCTRIC V03A3 LTD. (I 700,000)
TAH1MCT0 FOUIDBT kCLLB LTD. (I 1.000,000)
TOCTC BLRS UK. CO. (J 3,750,000)
aUAK r'JIKiL?!!, OC. (X 2,600.000)
ICSJtAH MICA DXTZLCC. 6ALBS (I 2.260,000)
TOnO BATT13T CO. (I 4M.00O)
lUOvri ELICTBIC ifCtifl LTD. (I 1.100,000)
TCOJLKl ELECTBIC VCZAB (I 4.050.CO0)
BTAJiDAJiP tLB. MACBIW SUJ-rt-T CCHTHOL (T 1,000,000)
IW«-ttiCTBIC '»»Trtl*a« CO. (X 2,CO0,0OO)
DAI SLVP-'M PAIfcT CO. '(X e ,00,000)
TOTO BX1CTBI0 Ml^i. (I 8,000.000)
TOXTCs-fJt^rfilC KTO. (X l.OX.COO)
AAMi'iAXA »\>BB. CO , (X 900,000)
KCB.03AH ILKTB1C MTO. (I 18.900,000)
bi:c«a cABua co. (x 1, boo. coo)
.
i,... MfC . Co
HorJTO UOKaI. LID. IX l.OOC.OCO)
IOTOKUBaB CC., LTD. (IO0r) (X 3,000,000)
BaXODATI iVZL OIL Tj>1 CO., LTD. I J i«0,OCO)
IITOSUMI SAW KILUs Cft., LTD. (X 4C3.O0Q)
TCa PHOSPHATE HOCX CO., LTD. tl 1- , |
COKJ l.'-r:- AS13CIU PTT., LTD. (t 1.6C0.CO0)
Utisnu nora kills co., lte. (x 1.000,000)
HOKOOLlAl MICA CO., 1,70. (X 500,000)
KAHCHUBlAB HICi CO., LTD. (X 926,000)
BVJUB PAPiB K70. CC. (X 250,000)
TOA MICA CO. (I ;.r, )
KilAOArfA HACBlBTOiT CO. (X 3,600,000)
S0UTHXBJ1 PACITIC TivaI'ISO CO. (r 5,000,000)
KASCHURIAK A051 CULTURAL ISD. CO. (X 1,500,000)
WA COAL CO., LTD. (I 300,000)
3AIAHUSA. TSA MTC. 0;. , LTD. (I 350.000)
IKPISIAL BIBB AHD LEA^SK 1ND. CO. (I 1,«\000)
ItJi'JX lUEUBi CO., LTD. (X 600,000)
SC^AB UITTIHO AMD vtATISC CC. , LTD. (I 2,00D,CC0)
3HIM120 FHABKACrJTICAL CO., LTD. (X 190,000)
SEOVJ TKAD1S0 CO. (X 15,000,000)
70IU33IHA SHIPBUILDING CO. (I 1,000,000)
BiD-ji rw\ra kills co. (x 7,ooo,o&0)
SHASSI OliUSIH'S SALT CE»ICaL (X 6,500,000)
SSIliDO P.'K? HTC. CO., LTD. (X 1,000,000)
nCRIA 5TT3. HILLS, LTD. (X 2,500,000)
KAV-.'EUBIAH COIOi'IAL IE). CO. (X 1,126, COO)
TOSHltAXA CF3MICAL 1BD. KACB. (X 2,000,000)
JUEffl SHCIAI CO. (I 1,200,000)
IO^aS KaBIST; ?B0XCTS CULTITjaiM (I 16,500.000)
TOBKOSaB CHrf,ICAL ISBD3TFI CO. (X 10,500,000)
TOT-i DBT BAT TEST CO., LTD. (J 460,000)
rCJJOSAH AGF.ICtir.5AL D2'.T,L0r«Ci^ CO. (X 4ec,000)
iCMOBI CaHBICS 30C2S CO., LTD. (J 1,350,000)
Ja?;JT aCHICU;.TUKaL CeOBT (X lO.OCC.OCO)
TCA OIL 5EXD9 IKPOBI CO. (X IBO.COOJ
Atv-CKO ABXS ISD. CC.. LTD. (X E.CCO.OCO)
TorrO E3C? SflBVIlS CO. (X 10.OO0.CO0)
toa talus co., ltd. (x 5,000,000)
toa tea kto. co. (i eco.oco)
23;* MACBISHET Kti, CO. (X 1,000,000)
KaKCHVBXAI EDO- IKD. CO. (X 12,000,000)
TEA! CPIKICAL ISrWSTBTIS CO. (Baa! 600,000)
MJJfCHUBlAB-K^VCOLIAB I'iT^AL BZ^UvCtS CO. (X 6,000,000'
COBaI; CH3SICAL IKD. CO. (I 3,0CC,CO0)
kitihWa autouvbiia re. (x iro.coo)
OIUOBI KLICr^ICAL JBCOIVZSUU) (X 750,000)
JAP.Ji CU:y^ SOOLb COSTaOUIJW (I 6,500,000)
JAF.Jt MATCH EXfOHT (I 1,500,000)
Trail ag Co., lav. > Of 1*!
* 1JTSUB1SB1 HXiTt laXUSTRI (I 1,000,
f IJTSUiI5HI MI1.1K0 (X 407,400, COO)
I IJT5U2I5S1 BA.'.t (X 135, OX, 000)
f, IITSULISHI ClL (X 20,000,COO;
110.
150.
1,000)$ KsHCBUfilAH MITSOBISai KACi!I!3 TOOL (X 20,
i T.iKaJJ IKEUSTBX (X 3,000,000)
*: b:itob ikpjstbi (x 2,000,000)
f mitsubishi steamssip (x 70.000,000)
$ JtPAH COEH PECiDUCTS (X 77,600,000)
i SPJSGHAI KITSUBIEil *A.eJ3CVSl {* 1,000,000)
i rjJl ILTJSIBT (X 1,000,000)
{ klTSUBISHI LIGHT ALLOT KJG. (X 14,000.000)
'
- xLUXIEDM (X fO. *"oO,000)
i h:rcmi7Hi ckami:al istustrt KAcaiSEin (x 20,boo
f. hi Pi-:;* A.-auTic:i-fi-AL :r".:i, (x 20.000 .030J
.000)
100*: BIW.1 CDAL EAllECAD (X 1,800,000)
icoS Br^sfiiao babj 6 varbsocss tx a, coo. coo)
1004 eK*Td 3ASEALLI l"Ut COJLLGT iX 10,000,000)
10C4 TUBBTSU COLLIIST A COAL BA1L3CAD (X 10.0OO.0OO)
63H t^BIBABA CCiL HAIL (X 1,000,000)
60* B30TCXU COAL M1HIB0 (X 6,000,000)
64$ HLBTZO 8TIBL HTO. (X 6,000,000)
61< BOAJ CHBUCAL IjJD. (X 2,260,000)
boi f.ura-rcu coLLitnr (coal) (x ao, 000,000)
50i MC4AS LBOS KIBl DXTP. (X 60,000,000)
Tot OiAEU CCAL CO. (I 300,000)
60< HiBU-UI CCLLIC2T (COAL) (X 23,800,000)
44* S3AJ&-TUM OOLD (X 10,7t3,OOO)
53* BIIEEV C13TEAL COAL BALLh^D IX U. 000,000)
3^s M1SIBG KACS1ST CO. (I 120,000)
254 KAHA3A1I COAL HIBIK3 (I 8,&X),D00)
1S< OUl MIBLBG 0OC33 B'STifTTICI (X 6,000,000)
lilt- VB1BAJ CCA1 CCLLItHT (I 13, COC, 000}
lit 1VATX HLH1SG MACHIBXiT (I 5,CS6|«00)
10.3* TTSUAAtA KLXCTBIC (I 100,000,000)
(MltroMthl Minion , Ltd. Bi It:
r"
|».<
KlTSlilSal TBADIKO (X 100,003,300)
klfSBBISHl BASI (I 135,000,000)
MJTSU3JSHI OIL (X 20,000,000)
MITSUBISHI CBXXICAL (X 110, TK, 000)
IUJI 1KXUSTR1AL (X 1,000,000)
MITSUBISHI LIOHT ALLOT MIO. (X 14,000,000)
BIPPOK ALOMUUH (I 60,000,000)
KCaxAH Asr;jiKACin (x to. 000,000)
MITSUBISHI CBMCAL IBDIiSI
I
.6 < tUtsUBISKI C£«1CAL (
hial ka:h. (r ?o, &», oooj I
OtlCA X 112.790,000)
-H
.01 f. MITSUBISHI RGBSKA U 340,009,000)
.001* MITSUBISHI hi/Vi i:;-.L:,:I (I 1,000,000,000, I
.a % MITSUBISHI rBAOIHO (1 100,000,000)
.2 i MITSUBISHI tLiCTKlC (X 120,000,000)
FCBRUARY <; G GHQ SCAP NUMBER 40
100* TSUkUTA (X 210.000)
68* BIBBHIX rOX A KABIBI 1J3ELUC1 (X 13,000.000)
60* JAJ'AB ATC9AJB trOUBTHO LTD. (I 60,000)
tO< BHHXC BUILDIBO CO. (X 1,000,000)
39i rapoKAt kAiiijr* a tnx in. co. (x 1,000,000)
M* KABCWIU rlHJ A KAfltm US. CO. IX 6.000.000)
26* DA18BT riBB A MAJilKB US. CO. (S 10,000,000)
27* TOA TIBS A MABJlrk IBS. CC. LTD. (X 26 .COO.000
)
.*» MLrr\M »**.»»-<» to, C* o.i^j.v-^j*
16i DAItU riBl A hii'll ]*". (X 2,000,000)
ni TOITOALAUI (X l.OTXJ.OOO)
11* TAIOHO KAilM A rout IS). CO. (X 21.000,000)
(totjft Mario. A Pirn In.%rtoe» Oft., Li*. U> U»*^-

t>74 IfklJIM-OUMI CD.. LTD. (1 •)
I 30i 3PXCIAL 0US3 * OPTICAL IH5 THU!<gfn £X IWO . OCO) |
hlPrOa IRCB tfORXS, LID. (J( 3CO.OOO)
SUFOS CUSS llfiRK CC. , LTD. (1 •)
i;:lits ivojstsi co., ltd.
CI JBUTOMO TAaX. < » 73.67*. OOP
)
(34%)




5$ WTOS LIGHT KSTAL (X SCO, 000, 000)
| 9* SUMITOMO CO-OPEHATI'/U JXSCiTnC F0VK1 (» 20,000,000} I
12$ CauaBS SUMITOMO LIGHT KiTALfX 80,OJQ,000)
zf, sippcs aircraft capjiieb (x m.oco.ooo)
2$ hippos music KsraiMcrr (x 30,000, oco)
20$ Hissam niciaic apparatus (i 3,oco,ooo)
10$ TXIfOflJ SPECIAL STEZL WO. (* 26, COO, 000)
7$ TOTO COXMUKICATtCa APPARATUS (I It ,000,000
)
hi HPPCOJ C0MMV3ICATICB IWWSTBI35 (T 10,000,000)
104 TCSAI BUBBSR ISDU3THT £* 5.000,000)
4$ RliXT METAL IHDU3TBJI3 (X 14, 000, COO)
3$ 1»U M3IAL IBDUSTS15S (X 60,000,000)
3$ KTUSltt AIBCKAJ1 MABUPACTUilltOtX 30,000,000)
3$ menu aims MAtfujAcruajso {* 12,000,000)




SUMITOMO SABX (X '3,675,000)
sumitomo alvmibum prcductiob (I 20,000,000)
SUMITOMO RlCHISKSr MORIS (X -10,000,000)
3UMITOM0 UiSdCAL CO. (X 110,000,000)
SUMITOMO H.SCTRIC IMDU373IE3 (J 123,000,000)
81KIT0M0 CCHMUiilCATIOS ISDUSTal (X 150,000,000)
SUMITOMO MXTAL IHDUSTHI (J 418,750,000)
SUMITOMO KARSHOUSS (X 15,000,000)
SUMITOMO CO-OPMATm 1LKTKIC FOVXR (X 30,000,1
SUMITOMO TBU5T {* 20.000.COO) «j
1C$ 8IPP0H ASRIAI RLZCTRIC IHSTaVMETJ (X 10,000, COO)
1£$ TOHOfU H3TAL IK)U5?£I2S (X 10,000,000)
40$ X0B&A2I SCALE SHAPE BLACi L1AD MJG. (X 2,500,0'JO)
16* ARTV5C LIGHT METAL (I 200,000,000)
13* SUMITOMO EEAL ESTA?* 4 LLDO. (X 41,500,000)
1* SUMITOMO KISIKQ (J 80,000.000)
21* SUJUTGHO MACUIBEHY MOB S3 (X 40,001,000)
10$ CHOSZtf SUMITOMO LICST METAL (150,000,000)
33,( 3UMIMM0 STB7TL»TIC E.VJi:f (1 20,003,000)





ll lrausi-aixs or ma-Vcbuhla, ltd. u 30,000,000)
IOBXaS SUMITOMO STJUX MOMS, LTO. (I 6,030,000)
ALUHIHUM SUMITOMO, LTD. (! 4,500,000)
HaSCUU2IAM LIGHT MtFAL ALLOY I;ID. CO., LTD. (X 54,000,000)
HAKSURJAH STZXL TUI£ 1SDUSTHIAL CO., LTD. (X 2, 500,000)
uIldt-SKljre MI2IKC CO., LTD.
SAZAVi METAL imWSTBISS, LTD. (Jf 3,000,000)
- IHDUSTHIH, LTD, (J 14,300,000)
D3AXA KiTAL ISD'JSTaiES, LTD. (* 60, 000, COO)
USHl;.A*A SPIffilK CO., LTD. (I 1,800,000)
UaCHAlT MT3. CO., I.TO. (I 12,000,000)
SOMA ??£CISi iaSTEUki-STS MJO. CO., LTD. (S 4,000,000)
C7SULA ISOU /OfliS LTD. (I •)
£BISU"fA MACHIHK TOOL HVO. CO,, LTD. (J S, 500,000)
KH'^iU A13CHU? UN. CO., LTD. « 30,000,000)
RTUS11U ASH8 KPO. CO.. LTD. (J 12,000,OOC')
r-lAL ST*£L M>0. CO., LTD. (J 25,000,000)
SUMITOMO SFiCIAL STKJ. MW. CO., LTD. (I 20,000,000)
TiUOIU CC3U=B256tQ GAS CO., LTD. (J •)
0SAX.V MACHin TOOL IBDOSTRIAL CO., LTD. (( 1,000,000)WW KETAX IKWSSIHAL CO., LTD. (K fl, 000 ,000)
: ':.;-. i:j., LVD. (X 6,000,000)
kit}. CO., LTD. (I »)
ri!C IHCUSTMUS, LTD. {X 4,CX>0,000)
TGKTO TISS lOMISO WUFSS CO.. LTD. (I 5.200,000)
I ISO CO,, LTD. (* 6,000,000)
BIPfCU PIPH KfO, CO.. LTD. (» 14,400,000)
J [KDaSTM2S,LT0.{* 900,000)
TAKAtJUU MISIKC CO., LTD. ("i 600,000)
BHICI M30, CO. II 150,000)
SJPPOS 3FKIAL STISL XLLZTiCPUllVQ CO., LTD. (V •)
IOCHI MIKIKO CO., LTD. (( 260,000)
HAjrVA SILICA MIVIlo CO., LTD. (J 150,000)
AMAGJiSAjri its KjO, ,\ RllWfllBATIOH CO. LTO. (J 195,000)
WO. CO., LTO. (X 30,000,000)
. HACUISSai kfOPJIS LID., {i ^, £00,000)
TkHAUCHI M>ATJ7ACI'JfllMG CO., LTD. (It 5,0-jO.OOO)
UK 1ATT CO., LTD. (I 30,000,000)
E -....; KFO. CO.
. LIU, [\ •)
WAiUTlMA TRACt CO., LTD. (I 10,000, OCO)
tEI^A jil.T s.3i. CO., LTD. (( •)
1 (I ')
:. votes, LTD. (1 •)
ST CO., ITT'. (I •)
"*1*I 1
1
iO CO., LTD. (I •)



























JKHOi n.U0BJT2 HU'tn {4 2, OCO, 000)
HCETB CHIHA COLD MIHIItO (J 1,7^,000)
TOI MISI30 (J 3,fi00, OCO)
DAI-SIHCS MIBISO CO. (J 5,000,0*))
TIliCCCD CCM7?JS3£D 0A3 (| •)
TlirCW SPLOLAL STHL (I 23,000,000)
KAScrimiAS Licnr kltal allot !;rju3TJlt (' m.ooc-.ooo)
SUMITOMO MiTAL iHDCSTaT OT MASCItffllA (* 30,000,000)
ILPPOH MWC IKSTBUHIIIT WO. (S 30,000.t00)









.1UMIT0M0 MIKIMO (I 80,000,000)
j
SUMITOMO LiMK U 73,676,000)
SUMITOMO ALUMISUM LtDUCTICS (f 20,000.000)
SUMITOMO KACHIfcEkT »;£K3 { 40,000,000)
SUMITOMO C1KM1CAL (V 110, Of<0, 000)
3UMITCK0 EL.ICRUC IKDUST81IS (J IPO, 000,000)
SUMIT0M3 HI7AL IKDUSTBJIS (I 41.8, 7£0, 000)









100> TOI 8TOTH1TIC CHIXICaL IH). LTD.
16* TOHOKU CLtVOOD KU£JtS, LIE. i
32> HIFF01 SIlfBoaiC 1LKSJM xcaig (J •)
.


















/ii itcoava ismcfiaiT oj mcraic pqtzi co., ltd. (s i, 750,000)
L_r
r
6% SUMITOMO CO0PIBATI7X ULICTEIC K'Jt& {1 20,000,000) I
10$ SUMITOHa METAL IUT)'JSTR1E3 OP Mj.HCHliaiA [J 30,000,030) .
XHO H1HIM0 U 80, OCO, COO)
—I
3* IA1BAI LIGHT Ml.TAL H0ULD1KG « «)
33). SAU-NS >XTAL IirDUSMISS (* 3,000,000)
21jt H21GVU MAC3I!.- : TOOL MFC. (* 5,500,000)
2$ AVIAMiQA HISISO II 6,000,000)
8J TOHOEU MITU I'IDIBTHIM (¥ 10,000,000)
21 SUMITOMO C03PtiATIVS SUCTWC PCWSB (? 20,000,000)
3* SUMITOMO JISAL .STlTt BL20. « 41,500,000)
20j> SUMITOMO 3CEiri-> PLAKTATICa (f 2.500,0-30)
94 SGMITCHC Crj-)a r:!ICATlCH IliDUSTBJSS (I 150.000,000)
14 SUMITOMO HISIBO (* 80,000,000)
54 ASTUS3 Lion K-.TAL (X 200,000,000)
2< SUMIT-CMO MKTAL (« 4l8,7tO,000)
6* CEOSES SUMITOMO LIGHT KJtTAL <? 30,000.000)





ejt co., no. i* 1,600,0001
.S3 ¥0?J:S, LTL'. {i 1,000,0(10)
,CHIST?.I VOaXS. LTD. (J COu.OOO)
-UOrOOBAPli V0J;K5, LTD. (X 103,000)
KCiTM CBISA MACSISEHX HfDUSTBIAL, IZZ. (» 12,000,000)
16* yas-.u.'.a k^-cthi: i'j.Ci;i:resr vozis, lti»". (v ib, 000,000)
25]( KATS-10 HKATT 1SDUSTRIIS. LTD. (¥ 1,500.000)
r"
12* nUKOIU Q^KPKESKD CAS *
11* ECIESCX PROMOTIOS (V 100,000,000)
ip avamuba Minuo (« 6,000,000)
J ii SUKITCMO ILiCTKKE 2 E1C IKDUSTEUS (K 120,000,000)J
lit
-'.' ::-, ictu'-rc, l-:, (j fi.oco.rooj
SHOVA (IRS ROPS MFG. CO.. LTD. (X 2,000,000)
»u:;a« itv-c-.'sic ap?asatus CO., ltd. Cx 3,000,000)
OSASA DIAM0S11 UXUSTRI£S, LTD. {X 2,000.000)
OSA-f.A HSTAL imOSTRKS, LTD. (X 5,000,000)
TOrj.1 ftJ3Jij ISLj'JSTSISS, LTD. (X 5.000.000)
XCTtA BUI33E IHDUSTRIE3, LTD. (X 3, COO, 000)
E1ZAI TStMSI RUBBXH V0BXS, LTD. (I 45O.0CO)
MASERU SLSCT.UC M1RS CO.. LTD. (H 40, 300, OCO)
BC-riTH CHISA [ISCTRIC VIRS CO., LTD, (X 30,000,000)
SIPPOB SUBMA.UM C.\BIJ: CO.. LTD. (I 12,000,000)
SHOJk' ILZCT.^IC VIRB 4 CA2LS CO.
, LID. (X 10.tO0.000)
ruji ;-' :21c Mifti co., ltd. (i 25,000,000)
CHIBA E1ACTAIG IBDUSTRIM, LTD. {% 5,000,000)
CaOSSH SLKT3IC tflMt CO., LTD.. (X !, 000, OCO)
run* 0B1SDI53 CO., LTD. (X 5,000,000)
MIPFCa £L£CTiIC VIHS CO., LTD. U 4,000,000)
SKIOSO CiO»ICAL CO., LTO, (* 2,600,000)
ELBCTMC -i"--- DISTBlBUTIMa CCSTSOL CO.
. LTD. (I ")
Bll-i^S Kiili M*liK CO,, LID. t# ^,uOO,COO)
TOiAl 1UCTHIC KIBX CO., LTD. (X 7£0,000)
TSUJU KLiCT.ilC VI 112 CO., LTD (X 750,000)
XTCTO WIKI-GlLTI lUCUsTHIiS, LTD. (I 450,000)
MIICITJ iLLOTrJC WIBS CO., LTD.
SUM XLZCTJ-IC WIrtZ CO., LTD. (X •)
nuxrait t^ji cLim co., ltd (x •)
paohOTira co., ltd (x lao.coo) tat
TOHOKU Xi7tJi IHDUSTBIBS, LTD. (X 10,000,000)
TOTO CcHMOSICATIOS APfAiy.T'US CO.. LTD. (X 15,000,000)
AJTRITS-' IL-. -.:r]C CO., LTD. (X 10,000,0-30)




SICI WW CO., LTD.iX 1&5.O30)
Un . . I <5 CO., LTD, (X 12,000,000)
sipj - c ;iai s ikdvstries, ltd. (x 10,000,000)
HIPPvS AKiUAL SLKTRIC Il'STHUKBKT CO., LTD. (* 10,000,000;
l»aUMK2AXl WIRE1SSS UCU1KX Kit. CO., LTD. (X 'WO, 000)
ELJO.r.IC HAJCHISS IKDUSTHILS, LTD. (X 2,000,000)
HXKPOtl SLECTSIC iLAis CO., LTD. (X 3,000,000)
miOXU CfJiKi CO., LTD. (X 700,000)
KATlOl^J. Iti'-NS* APPARATUS MPtJ. . CO. LTD. (I 400,000)
i CO.. LTD. (X 1,000,000)










nilOICU COMhUSHCATlOli IKDU5T3IK3, LTD., (X 16.030,000)
Ifpcs Tiuraaw khjipwmt co., lto. [x 7,500,000)
TUIC ruKGSTOi ISDUSTEIIS. LTU. (S 1.600,000)
MlSKB IHDUSTaiBS, LTD. (X 1,000,000)
IiAlICHI AU/jTIJ/G CO., LTD. (X 1,000.000)
TOtro patsoL kisin co., ltd. (x wo.ooo)
OAJ.IAMA PiulXCTUBI COKHLrtClAL H1RILXS9 CO.. LTD. (X •)
DOTS SI
1. C0WPAM3S LISTTD IX SOLD) B01ZS ABZ 53E5IDU3HS DTOn DIFJCT CONTROL OJ TR2 PlKOT
HOLD I KG • COSTBOI 07 BDaSIDUSIl! OT 7Z3 PAB35T EC'LEIBO CCKPAH




4. PBlCDnAaiS '... 3T0CI ^\C 3T A irMITOHO COi3SK3. PSpatDTioHS IilSTBD
1 UB Till AM0U5T OT SWCI EL2 DHBCTLT 3T T73 SUMITOMO TAMrtUS.
8. onmis Piii!Co?tLiT ceo$s aoLDiaos amckj j-x>i:iii3i2s in »t» seow.
* DATA UNAVAILABLE





TOTO CCMKUSlClflOS APPAEATUfl (X 15,000,000)
ABEIT30 SLLCT7UC (I 10.000,000)
M1PP0B COHMTJIICA.TICM IRPU3TST {» 10,000,000) I
I
I (X P0.C-3O.O00) I
IAS 1 11_£^C TilO_F ~£2j X_20 , CO0rtX)0)
36i BASHIHAMl DOCX CO. (I l,t
LZli SUMITOMO KACSnjC V03£3 (X 40,000,000)
17$ SUM I TCMO CO-CPISATIW EUCfilC ?C«B (X 20,000,1
i
JE-iOL PLL'OHin KISIVO CO., LTD. (X 2,000,000)
BORTB C3ISA OOLD HISISO CO., LTD. (X 1,700,000)
TOI KlBIKu CD,, LTO. (X 2,500,000)
CUBLKOK MlilBO CO., LTD. (X 5,000,000)
SAZAIIS KIH1B0 CO., LTD. (X 1,500,000)
KCiLAi Z.\£±lX-S)Hfi2 RLACl-LIAD MJO. .CO. ,LTD. (X ;
tiSAUTUCH! JilSlJTO CO., L». (X 3,000,000)
TAlTO M1KIS5 CO., LTD. (5 1,030.000)
TUGI CCWJiSClAL '/J. , LTD. (X 200,000)
MAISUO MISIS4 CO.,. LTD. (I 10,CX»,CO0)
UltMSBU SBIFPI»0 CO,, LVD. (I 5.000,000)
SOBISAil &JM HIILDJBO tfOSiS, LTD. (X •)
UOXHAJDO COLUAHI s^iCLtS CO., LTD. (I 160,000)
OTARU COAl tBASSPOBTATIOH CO., LTD. (X •)
HIItLDiA DUPPIBG CCST20L CO., LTD. (I ")
Ti^HiT-tn C0LLI13I CO., LTD. tX «)
404 SUMITOMO TAXI ChJUICAL CO., LTD (3 12,000,000)
404 ^USTO P*13T CO., L'J). (X 3,750,000)
6?£ 9PKCIAL 0LAS3 * G?IK*L IjSTRU-iJITS CO. , LTD. {X 500,000)
50$ HIPKfl CAa=:rS .SDUSTHI CO., ITT. (X 1?. 0-30, 000)
S3S HASSHU XB1BC Pill .... LTD. (I 500.000)
59$ ORIiVTU -•" ' .--=TRIAL CO. , LTC. (I •)
10$ TAIGAS oauvic ?RODi ; co., ltd. (x •)
11< NIPPCS STTLPKURi: 4 BIT2IC ACID CC3TTB0L CC. . LTD. (X •)
12$ TX1I0EI COMI'RESaD 0A3 (X •)
9$ CEIT1UL SRIPPIbC (I 5,000,000)
6$ MATSUO K1BIX3 (X 10.000.OX)
50$ J3EE0L PLUOSITi MIfl)tO(X 3,000,000)
4$ SSIOSO CRIMIC11 (X 2,500,000)
n$ Sumitomo coopiPATiri nicTsic po«h (» 20,000,000) |
3$ SUMITOMO KACEIIZBZ *0£I3 (X 40,000,000)
16* ABTUIIG LIOHT KTHI (X 200. COO, 000)
3$ SUMITC^KO STSTSKIC kiSIB (X 20,000.000) |
10* CHOSM S (Ml TCMO LIGHT KtTAL (X 60, COO, OCO)




74 SUMITOMO MIXIHO {X 80,000,000)
Z3% SUMITOMO WJOBO'JSJE (X 15,000,000)
7$ SUMITOMO BXAL tSTATX A ELDO. (X 41.500.000)
404 sumitomo raasa (x 20,000.000)
'3fl SUMITOMO'ALUMI.'.'UM 2S5UCTI05 CO. (I M.VOO.OOQ)
3$ SUMITOMO MACK1I.TLST VOLTS (I 40.000,000)
2$ SUKJTOHO XIJCTEIC IS1>S5TRIES (X 120,OiW,000)
6$ 3«IITO«0 RATAL IlIULsriLES (X 418.700,000)
*$ JIPl'Oi sasrr gijss ii L2.25u,ooo)
3$ SUMITOMO CV-7X?J.TLYS TLZOISIC tX 20,000,000)
[jionln'tasiif-!
HP
OH SAiii. KOKDRZD A SJI IAAT , LTI. (I •)
33$ Mirt panx ur.-1 ., (r s.noo.ooo]
S0< SUMITOMO BAKU 0/ SSaTTLX (X •)
tit SUMITOMO SIX! M CALIIOSKIA (I •)
98$ UAJtiTSO IKE ... :/.'. CO. ,1 . . [I •)
68$ SAMSHU I.'. ' ..-U. CO.
,
i -. (I •)
Ml IIXXl hDTUAL AID PlMAMCIliO CO., LTD. (X J.aM.lKXi)
10J$ WAUIiMA H1XU0US1 CC, LTD. (I )
90$ SUMITOMO 1>A.M U Hi Will (I •)
20$ CSiAA VOOLXK TUIIU CO., LTD. (X •)
LOf TOA [V4UIt] : D. [| •]
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LEGEND
INDICATE DIRECT CONTROL
INDICATE SIIAREHOLDINS WITHOUT CONTROL
INDICATE IN1KULOGKIN0 RELATION AMONO
MAIN SUBSIDIARIES.
SOURCE. YASUDA HOZENSHA.
itUin tU'iriL or 1
ESTS
SUBSIDIARIES, SUB-SUBSIDIARIES AND
INVESTMENTS OF THE YASUDA HOZENSHA
ON DECEMBER 31 1945
JAPAN




ZAIBATSU FAMILY OWNISRSHIP PATTERNS (1946)
{% of Stock Held)
crip tion Mitsui Mitsubishi























Botes: a. Figures are averages of companies in the same
group.
b. Figures in parentheses indicate number of companies.
(Philadelphia: OrientTwest Publishers, 196*9), p. 3.
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force to link whole constellations of subsidiary firms to the
parent organization. Typical of this traditional ideology,
was the formal swearing of an oath of loyalty to the company
which took tho following form:
Oath of the Southern Sakhalin Colliery & Railroad
Company1
1. I shall never violate the orders of the
president or the instructions of my senior officers.
2. I shall sincerely and assiduously perform
my duties, never bringing loss to the company.
3. I shall never divulge to a third party any




4. I shall keenly bear in miud never to violate
any of tho rules of the company.
5. W.\th respect to any business I transact, I
shall always follow the instructions of my senior








Southern Sakhalin Colliery & Railrsad Company
,„,, .
Ha
Ji cT* j^ness Power, P . 56. As Miss Hadleyindicates, it is interesting to note that the form is writtenin extremely formal, literary Japanese-.
. . employing thehonorific and humble forms. Thus, for example,
. /.the
wora company is
. . prefix* th an honorific (thehonorable company), the word ! I' by a humble qualifier."
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However, not ones to leave the delicate control
mechanisms to tradition, families and honshas instituted other
management techniques to secure relationships. Some of the
major ones were:
1. Ssvere punishment of even the highest executives
for a show of independence or by otherwise incurring the
displeasure of the family.
2. Direct appointment by the honsha of the board of
directors, president, and/or officers of subsidiary companies.
In the event that, for instance, a president was selected, he
might be alio -red to name his own officers, but only with
approval of the honsha .
3. Tie formation of interlocking directorates whereby
directors or ranking members of the honsha served in various
high operating or administrative positions in one or more of
the key subsidiaries (Table 3).
4. Requirements by the honsha that subsidiaries
submit the agenda of all board or director's meetings to it in
advance.
5. Periodic "management-report meetings at which
(major subsidiary) presidents and chief executives . . .
delivered reports on their activities to representatives (of)
the . • e family and the parent coiapany,
"
xHyutaro Komiya, ed., Postwar Economic Growth in Japan ,
translated b> ert S, Oza.ki "(Berkeley: University of"




SUMMARY OF INTERLOCKS BETWEEN OFFICERS OF FIRST-LIKE
SUBSIDIARIES AND OFFICERS OF THE TOP HOLDING
COMPANY IN THE MITSUI, MITSUBISHI AND
SUMITOMO COMBINES, 1945
Position in Subsidiary
Presi- Chair- Director Auditor No. Interlocks
dent man with holding
comoa ay
Mitsui
Mitsui Trading * 1 2
Mitsui Mining # 2 3
Mitsui Trust # 1 2








Machinery- # 1 2
Mi tsui Ohem.Ind.. * 1 2
Mitsui Real Est* * 1 2
Ml +r.n1 OV><«^4«'» i Tt*A lfWW«*<*. Wi4*^*^g ^ JL
Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus try * 3 5 9
Mitsubishi Trading # 5 3 9
Mitsubishi Bank * 3 4
Mitsubishi Mining •; A 4 9
Mitsubishi Elec, * 7 2 10
Mitsubishi Chem..
Indus try # 3 3 7
Mitsubishi Oil 3 3
Mitsubishi SteeD.
Fabricating # 5 1 7
Mitsubishi Trust * 3 2 6
Mitsubishi Ware-
house 2 1 3
Mitsubishi Real





Presi- Chair- Director Auditor No. Interlocks
dent man with holding
company
Sumitomo
Sumitomo Mining a- # 2 2 6
Sumitomo Elec.
Indus try # 2 3 6
Nippon Electric * # 1 2 5
Sumitomo Metal




Sumitomo Mach. * 1 2 4
Sumitomo Chera.
Industry * * 2 2 6
.
Sumitomo Alum.
Reduction * 3 1 5
Korea Sumitomo
Light Metal 8,
Sumitomo Bank # 3 1 5







Insurance # 3 1 5
Sumitomo Ware-
house * 2 1 4
Japan Engineer-
ing # * 2 2 6
Sumitomo Co-op
Electric Power * 1 3 5
aNot listed on table.
Source: Kadley, Antitrust , p. 83.
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6. Exclusive buying and selling arrangements,
7. Use of combine banks for intracombine financing.
By reviewing both short- terra and long-term
applications for credit,, the combine bank and its
affiliated financial institutions could also check
on (or strengthen coordination and control of)
subsidiary activities.^
The extent to which zalbatsu banks controlled lending can be
seen in Table 4.
TABLE 4








Vo n nn o i t
Total of 4 baiiks 6,702





Mote: Because of a policy to promote Dank mergers adopted in
1927, the four Zalbatsu banks by 1931 jointly had 38.2
percent of the total national deposits in their banks
vis-a-vis 22,1 percent which thsy had held in 1926, just
before the policy was initiated. This trend continued
until the end of World War II. In this sense, the 1944
figurea (are overstated) ... as representative prewar
figures.
Source :Kozo lamamura, Economi c Policy In Postwar Japan
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967),
p. 112..
llladley, Antitrust, p. 29
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Zalbatsu Economic Pa tterns
In addition to the semantic difficulties engendered by
the word "zalbatsu. " attempts to define the economic nature of
zaibatsu business concentrations have led to much disagreement
between experts. Mainly, this disagreement appears to have
its origin in discerning whether or not the combines were
competitive or noncompetitive between themselves, and, as an
extension of this, if they were, in fact, monopolies.
Two factors evolved which served to cloud these issues
even more: first were the various methods used to measure the
effect the zaibatsu had on the economy; second was the propensity
in Japanese literature and speech to refer to the zalbatsu in
terms of dokuisen shlnon (monopoly capital).
There are two main methods us fid to gauge the economic
impact of the zaibatsu combines. The first is a percentage
measure of the paid-in capital ("the amount received • . • from
2
stockholders whether in cash, property or services") as derived
by "totaling the paid-in capital of the subsidiaries within the
various combine networks and dividing this by the total of
paid-in capital for the nation."^ The net result Indicates the
strength in selected industries of each , zaibatsu combine in
relation to each other and relative to an aggregate total for
^Seymour A. Broadbridge, Industrial Dualism in Japan
(Chicago j Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), p. 5S.
2Di c tipnary off, Bus 1 ne s
a
. p . 449.
^Hadley, Anti/frrust. p. 45.
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the nation. However, a major problem with this analysis
emerges when a decision must be reached on what subsidiaries
constitute the individual combine and which source data to use
to compute aggregate totals. An example of the latter problem
appeared, for instance, in 1946 when "the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry reported
. . . ¥32 billion, the Ministry of
Finance, ¥43 aillion, and the Bank of Japan, ¥48 billion'*1 as
the aggregate total paid-in capital of Japan.
The sscond method of calculating economic Impact is to
measure business concentrations based upon a percentage share
of defined markets. However, problems similar to those
experienced l:i the paid-in capital technique are also found
here. Decisions must be made, again, as to what subsidiaries
are to be included in defining anv —•+i*,»i _~~.-u.s-_. ,_, .,, _^j.^vaww, -»_* * W j. *«*ab ^ iV ^tix ucuacu u<»-'i~uj..u.t3
, whether
or not to select out only competing firms in the "capital-
intensive" sector of the economy as opposed to the aggregate
measure of all industries (large, medljua and small); and what
(or how much) output constitutes the "market" for any single
product or group of products? Since there is no standard
industrial classification system such as is found In the
United States, it can be said that
. . • Inadequacies in statements o:° Japanese
total output are so great that the (concentration
ratio; percentages are only roughly indicative,indeed, there are substantial differences between
* 1 • l° ne set of) figures and others, similar but




Corwin D. Edwards, ' Dissolution of the JapaneseCombines, Jc LJ^Ml^Mi^lTB (September, 1946), P ,232.
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The problem resulting from the equation of the £aiba£su
and dokusen shlhon was the connotation that the zaibatsu
combines were automatically monopolies—a fact which will be
shown to be not true in the economic sense, but true Insofar
as the combines were involved with imperfect competition
sectors, i.e., "monopolistic competition." In addition, it
was correct terminology in the concepts of "Japanese Marxist
usage"1 from -fhich it was derived. Typical of the practical
application of this concept was the statement in 1935 by
Mosaburo Suzu&i from his book NIpro n _1 okus en Sh iho n no, Ka lbo
(Anatomy of fie ..Japanese Monopolistic Capital) in which he
described zaibatsu groupings as "a form of monopolistic
konzern.
"
WVia+. 'is mnno-nnlv? "Even wit.hnv t. the inmfidiments
enumerated ab^ve, a precise definitlor is Illusive. Under
Common Law, monopoly is generally conceived to be "an abuse of
free commerce whereby one company or a group endeavors to get
exclusive control over strategic sources of materials, means
of production, or distribution. . . .'
3 The monopolist can
dictate prices since he is the only ore producing in that
particular industry or competition is insignificant in terms of
pricing. However, this is a generalized description and the
^Hadley, Antitrust, p. 319.
Quotation of Mosaburo extracted from lamamura,
Economic Policy, p . 1 11
.
^Dj c tlonary of Bus 1ns ss , p. 404.
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difficulty in transferring from a general frame of reference
to a specific one has been summarized by United States District
Court Judge W. 0. Noyes, who said:
The phrase "control of the market" . . .
means the control of the disposition of a given
product in a given market. It involves, primarily,
the suppression of competition and, as incidental
thereto: (1) the control of production; (2) the
regulation of prices.
It is not essential, however, to the control
of the market . . . that it should, be complete.
Practical control is sufficient: and this does not
imply an absolute elimination of competition. On
the other hand, a mere restriction of competition
does not give control of the market and is not
unlawful. • . . Just where the line is to be drawn
between a lawful and unlawful restriction of
competition is practical suppression—must depend
largely upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. 3-
In order to achieve an overview of business concentra-
tions in Japan, two tables (3 and 6) are shown. Table 5«
although subject to the limitations previously enumerated,
clearly shows that by paid-in capital ratios, only. in the rarest
cases did one zalbatsu combine control, a substantial percentage
of the total, whereas it was much more common that the
collective zaibatsu (all combines) did dominate. Table 6,
showing market ratios, indicates that whereas one combine may
have had a large percentage of one segment of a single market,
other combines operated within the. framework of the same
market.
1Quotation extracted from Dictionary of Business , p.
404 and is derived from W. 0. Noyes, Intercorporate Relations ,
pp. 352, 356.

THE ROLE OP THE ZAIBATSU IN JAPAN'S ECONOMY (1937-1941-1946)
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Financial sector consists of ban! ing, trust, and insurance.
°Hea7y industry sector consists of mining, metal manufacturing, machine tool,
shipbuilding and chemical.
cLight industry sector consists of paper, ceramics (including cement), textiles,
agriculture, forestry, marine products, feed and miscellaneous.
d0ther industries are electric pov
tion, real estate/construction/warehousin^:
ftFl?ures for Nakajima not availabl
Source: Rearranaed from data in fi
or/gas, land transportation, marine transporta-
,
commerce and trade.
e for the years 1937 and 1941.








































































































POSITION OF THE TOP FIRM, TOP THREE FIRMS AND
FIVE FIRMS IN SELECTED MARKETS, 1937, 194-9
TOP
Indus try 122L__ 1212.
Top 1
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With the premise that, under a strict definition of
terms, the individual zaibatsu combines could not be called
monopolies, then, under the workings of imperfect competition
where there are few producers who control the majority of any
single product market, they would be known as oligopolies.
However, ther3 is one unusual aspect; the zalba t.su combines
through their subsidiaries appear time after time competing in
multiple markets. Table 7 illustrates this phenomenon by
indicating leiding combines in selected markets during 1943 and
194-4. In this respect, the Japanese practice does not follow
the standard Western conception that different oligopolists
exist, as a rule, in different markets (i.e., one manufacturer
will only compete as an oligopolist In one market, not in
mn.nv) .
This now leads to the question concerning competition
between zaibatsu combines. Detailed research done in this area
by Eleanor M. Hadley shows that the ccmbines, in fact, were
competitive but enjoyed a cordial type of oligopolistic
relationship in that they developed a "live and let live"
business philosophy toward each other, This quid pro ouo
existence was based upon a rationale that it was not worth the
price of gaining a piece of one market by cutthroat competitive
tactics while losing in another market where they faced the
same competitor who had control. Indicative of this balanc.













































Japan Iron Mfg. 79;^
Japan Steel Pipe 14
Okura Steel Mfg. 2
Amagasaki Iron Mfg. 2
Nippon Seitetsu Japan Iron Mfg. 53.5$
Nihon Kokan Japan Steel Pipe 15.4
Kawasaki Jukogyo Kawasaki Heavy Ind. 4.6






Japan Iron Mfg. 9;
Sumitomo Metal Ind. 8
Kawasaki Heavy Ind. ' S
Mitsub. Steel Mfg. 2
Japan Steel Pipe 2
Nihon Keikinzoku Jauan Lieht Metals "S'S.O^OK A«n
Sumitomo Kagaku
Nihon Aruminumu




























































































Source: Condensed from Hadley, Business Power , pp. 373-379.
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situation were the inter-combine programs of investment in
certain private and national policy companies (Chart V).
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ZAIBATSU EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
The b;isio purpose of the following short historical
review of the political-economic develDpment of Japan is to
provide an insight into the base upon which the zalbatsu
rested, to examine the strength and dominance of the family as
a concept of business organization, and to show the relation-
ship between the government and the zaibatsu as Japan emerged
as a world power.
To remain within a chronological framework- the
chapter has boen divided into ma^or periods in Japanese
history as follows: the Tokugawa Era (1600-1868); the Meiji
Era (1868-191:?); the Liberal Era (1914-1931); and the
Militaristic J2ra (1932-1945), Each of these periods sets the
stage for the next and the last one provided the building
blocks upon which the attitudes expressed during the Allied
occupation were based.
Histor ical Perspective— The Tokugawa Era
^1^00-1868)
The Tokugawa period in Japan was an era of transition
from a feudal political, social and economic structure to the




of the feudal social and political framework. The Tokugawa
overlords established and maintained a strong centralized
government and held strict controls over feudal lords. As a
result, the country enjoyed a long period of peace, but the
steady growth of expenditures by both the central authorities
and the daimyo (local lords) pressed hard on the samurai
(warriors) who were the ruling elite class (shlzoku) of the
rigid social hierarchy. The nomin (peasant class) were also
subjected to pressure. As a money economy gradually replaced
the existing exchange economy, which had been based on rice,
and the daimyo took a larger and larger percentage of rice
which had to be converted to cash on tsrms which had become
increasingly Less advantageous, the peasants began to move ir>to
the urban areaa to look for work. Along with them came the
samurai whose economic wants had increased while their real
income had decreased. Thus, with incrsased urbanization, the
growing indebtedness of the samurai , daimyo and sho guns (war
lords) and the appearance of commercial and private credit
instruments, the wealth of Japan gradually passed into the
hands of the c-honln (merchant class )
.
It was this change in the economic structure, and the
social and intellectual ferment among the samurai as well as
Western pressure to end Japan's isolation, that provided the
impetus in the mid-nineteenth century for the overthrow of the
shogunate and it was during this era that the inception of the
oldest zalbaftgu
r




About 1620, Mitsui Hachirobei, who had renounced his
samurai status, entered the sakl {rice wine), loan and pawn
shop businesses in Matsuzaki, Ise Province. With capital
accumulated from these sources, he and his son Saburobi opened
a dry goods store in Edo which quickly became successful.
In l&r3 t the fourth and youngest son, Mitsui Taketoshi,
moved to Kyoto where he established a textile firm. Having
great business acumen, Taketoshi then opened a branch in the
textile wholesale center of Osaka and another branch in the
retail center of Edo.
To expand the base of his businesses, Taketoshi then
sought admittance to the money exchange guild. After nearly
ten years ojl waiting, m xocv * ne was admitted and xQUHd&xatel^v
opened a money lending and exchange business in Edo. Since
usury was the legal and the quickest method of accumulating
capital during the Tokugawa shogunate, the business prospered
and Taketoshi expanded again by opening branch exchanges in
Kyoto (1636) c.nd. Osaka (1691) as well as establishing a silJc
Jpjryja (wholesale house) in Osaka. The tonya took on a special
significance in that it became
. * . an Instrument through which production was
controlled, by c rcial capital^ both by
providing capital (to others for high interest
returns) and. by putting out (a system where
advances were made of raw materials and •
vice capital) raw materials. It was through this
iKame of Tokyo prior to 1868.
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controlling position that the tonya organiza-
tions were able to limit production and set
monopolistic prices on the goods they handled. 1
In 1691, Taketoshl, along with another Mitsui and ten
other individuals, came under official Bakufu (Tokugawa
bureaucracy) protection to handle transfers of official funds
via bills of exchange. The privileges of participation in thin
business were great as it increased the status of the house and
provided entry into the feudal political structure as well as
providing physical protection to the Mitsui house.
From these auspicious beginnings by Mitsui Taketoshl,
came the Housa of Mitsui. By bringing his sons into the
business, the house became an association of related families
rather than a single entity.
By 17:22, the Mitsui family had developed a written law
of the house which took root in the samurai concepts. Tne law,
which was writeen in the form of a will by Taketoshi, was all
encompassing, as can be seen from the following synopsis:
Under this code, the personal as well as the
business lives of the Mitsui (family) members were
subjected to regulation by a family council,
dominated by the head of the main family. Marriage,
divorce, adoption, and other personal matters were
so controlled, no less than the handling of corporate
investment, savings, and profit distribution., «, . .
It
. . .
had provisions (for) apprenticing male house




^•Charles Do Shelton, The Rise of, the s^in
Tokugawa Japan 1600-1868 (Locust Valley, N. Y\ : . J
,
us tin,
Inc., 1958), p. i
2Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution , pp. 9-10,
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The house rules as written by Taketoshi, lasted for 178 years
until, in 1900, they were revised with the assistance of
Western legal experts, but still served to tightly control the
framework within which the eleven Mitsui families operated*
In the middle of the eighteenth century, similar control
concepts took shape within the Mitsui traditional pattern of
Japanese paternalistic management whereby the lives of
employees (over 1,000 men and women bj then) were regulated in
minute detail. The extent of paternalism practiced during this
period was iniicated by Oland D. Russel s who, in his book The
Hous e of Mitsai. said
:
(The house) permitted a certain amount of profit
sharing a:nong the higher classes cf employees , and
strict rules governing rest period s, health,
sanitation and hygiene for all others. Dormitories
%T£NY»a r« £\ 4- * -.-. nvi^ 4-"U ^ w -v% •$ tvr\ 4-^. 1 -^ »«• *-. • , +%.<£> •&.!* **. «. »*. —. "I ^. ..— „ -. ,.,
were carefully looked after, Thej were coached in
proper sp?ech and required to be neat and clean in
attire.
i
In return for the honor, security and other advantages
secured through employment by the House, the feudal loyalty
demanded and received by Mitsui from -their employees was based
on real life terms and can be illustrated in this example of
a Mitsui banjo (chief clerk);
Iiie banto was sent on
. . .
(a) difficult
mission to explain an "unfortunate incident" to a
daimyo who, if displeased with the explanation,
could have forced the House of Mitsui "out of
existence." He took a dagger with him. "If his
testimony should fail to satisfy the lord, he was
^Quotation from Russel's, The
iu
Houg e of Ml ts ui . was




to disembowel himself en the spot and offer hislife as a price for exoneration of his masterJl^S? 6, 6 1.; The PaPers tha * this clerktook with him on this occasion are preserved to
urV'f'^ and bear testimony to the spirit withwhich he was serving his master."!
Chart VI shows the structure of the Mitsui House
during the Tokugawa years as it emerged into the Meiji
Restoration.
Sumitomo
Although not as well documented by Western authors as
Mitsui, the Sumitomo house also had deep roots in the Tokugawa
period but attained prominence in a different fashion. The
founder of the house, Masatomo (1585-1552), like Mitsui
Hachirobel, had renounced his samurai status and established
a bookstore and ironware business. By what was to turn out to
be a cleverly arranged marriage, Masatomo 1 s son-in-law happened
to be the son of a Kyoto copper merchant who had learned from
Europeans at Birado, the secret of extracting gold and silver
from copper ore. By marriage the secret became a monopoly of
the Sumitomo family who toned it into a fortune. The success
of the new metallurgical technique earned a bonanza for the
house, in 1691.
The Bakufu, who controlled all mines and minting
operations, conferred upon it permission to operate mines, a




































































































































































privilege granted to only the most prominent business famili-
By sending agents to scour the country for copper, gold and
silver deposits, Sumitomo was successful in the discovery of
rich ore locations. He was also successful in the effective
operation of the mines.
Historical Perspective— The Mei.U Era (1868-1Q1P
)
The Meiji Era, following the Restoration of 1868, can
be described as the time in which the economic growth of today
had its foundation. It was character is 3d by internal changi
in social stratification, the development of the zaibatsu as
recognized socio-economic organs, and Japan's emergence as a
world power.
Due to the threat of domination by the Western powers
after the middle of the nineteenth century, A private discontent
materialized into the fusing of a popular determination to
restore the emperor and repel the barbarians. This was brou,
to fruition when, in November 186?, young samurai leaders of
Satsuma, Chosu, Tosa and Hizen Provinces, with their peasant
troops, defeated the feudal army of the sho^un.
,
lThe appearance of the Russian, British, American and
French uuring the early nineteenth century, who dominated trade'
and cnaAlenged the policy of so Lon by a superiority of
arms, forced new pressure on the already strained To In
sho; a. The arrival of America val units in 1853 under
Commodore Matthew Perry, who demanded facilities for trade,forced the government to acquiesce and short] astern ers
obtained treats lich provided for ex ten;, commercia:
concessions and which g: bed extraterritorial status, thus
exe] ;.g them 1 Ji Qese jur.: tion. Ultimate'?





The Emperor Meiji was officially restored to power on
January 3, 1868, and in April of that year, issued a fiat for
reform. The leaders of the Restoration ruled as a bureaucratic
oligarchy in the name of the Emperor a.id immediately set out to
build a modern state by inauguration o;! social, political and
economic measures. The real purpose behind these moves was not
to democratize' Japan, but rather to be able to cope with the
Western powers by means of a united people, strong industry and
an equally strong military.
The old four major class social systems were formally
abolished. With the exception of the imperial family and a
nobility which had become enlarged to include certain samurai,
merchants or wealthy peasants who had contributed to the new
establishment, all people were classified equal^r as commoners,
Tne daiiiyos became salaried governors of prefectures and, in
general, the samurai who had been indennif led with government
bonds as restitution for their loss of income and status,
entered the professions, military services, business or the
bureaucracy. However, as the ruling cl.ass, the samurai had
formerly enjoyed a monopoly on education as well as managerial
experience and they quickly took advan-^ge of this to establish
themselves in the top echelons of their new occupations.
^Top were samurai ( shlzoku ) ; se:cond were peasants
(noni_n) j third vcere a'r tis ans '"'( ko p;e inin ) ; and last were the




The chief impetus for industrialization came from the
government which was convinced that modernization of the
economy and technical advances were essential to survival.
They first sel about adopting every aspect of Western
scientific discovery which pertained to a military industrial
base. To achieve this goal, Meijl leaders sought to induce
private capital into new Industrial endeavors, but were
generally unsuccessful due to:
1. TV. e weakness of private capital.
2. Tie Initial technical and organizational
difficulties machine production entailed.
3. The conservatism of private owners of
wealth. 2
In the twelve year period from 1868 until 1880, the
government participated heavily in the establishment of an
1 r> r'i n o +T* 1 al V\Qro "Ktr Annf Ji oao+^ rvvi o v%A A r±t' rsl r\ v\rrt ^ v* +- *t«f av^«-H w^
arsenals, shipyards, mines and foundries which had belongc^d to
"the shogunate and daimyos . Prom this foundation they then
expanded, with assistance gained by inserting foreign
technicians and instructors, into the strategic industries such
as chemicals, glass, cement, transportation (railroad and ship
building), and communications (telegraph and telephone).
Jointly with private investment, Keiji rulers became financially
^-Mitsui, Sumitomo and the recently established House of
Mitsubishi were notable exceptions to this policy of new
investment..
^Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial
DevelOBmen t l)i ...Japan: Governme nt Enterpr iser lffSo^lBBd
'
"[Stanford t " Calif . : Stanford University Press, 1955), p. .36,
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involved with supporting the textile industry. The rationale
behind this latter move was based upon the fact that textiles
were exported and a primary means of gaining money to pay for
foreign equipment and technicians. The authorities wished to
reduce to the barest minimum imports of any textile commodities
except capital goods and raw materials, With government
backing, the mechanization of silk production was fostered in
order to increase the quantity and quality of the product
since it was in the highest demand by Western countries. At
the same time, model textile mills for spinning and weaving
were Introduced and the government offered long-term loans to
importers of textile machinery so as to promote the entire
industry.
In the late 1880 's, the Meiji government began to sell
most of the enterprises under its jurisdiction to private
interests only holding back the railways, arsenals, ordnance
works, the naval shipyard at lokosuka, the telegraph system
and certain mines. Three major views have been proposed as to
why the government sold the industries: first, they were sold
to a few wealtay families for the purpose of forging an
alliance between the government and the small, but wealthy
capitalists; second, it was a political technique to mollify
opposition; third, it was necessary to save the gover] from
financial collapse. 1 In v.iy event, the sales resulted in the
transfer, to select groups within the private sector, of fully
x Ibid .. p. 87.
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equipped plants with modern machinery as well as technicians
and a trained labor force. Since there were no domestic
competitors and relatively few competitors in the entire Par
East, the initial impetus thus generated by these acquisitions
was never lost.
Due to the financial and political structure of the
Meiji government, only particular private interests were
selected to purchase the national industries. The principal
problem which Paced the early industrialization program was to
mobilize enoug.i capital to finance it. Although the majority
of large merchants and money lenders at Osaka and Kyoto (who,
by then 9 controlled 80 percent of the i Ion's wealth) had
joined in overthrowing the shogunate. they were conservative in
nature and hesitated to risk huge amounts of capital with no
assurance of profit and no protection against loss. As a
result, the government initiated a series of forced loans c .!:<'
their capacity as exchange agents for the Meijl finance office,
the 24itsui house, who had already made a contribution to the
new treasury, was assigned it responsibility for the
collection of these loans. Soon thereafter, it was decided to
spread the responsibilities for land tax collection, storage
and expenditure between three houses—Mitsui, Ono and Shimada—
which gave then distinct adv ges in that they could
temporarily enjoy the use of- the fur.: „- were in -;
possession of the house. In addition, this grou, ' to
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perform exchequer services for some seventy-five local govern-
ment units 1 ' which served to increase their span of Involvement
and control. However, in 1874, after the government suddenly
demanded a radically increased amount of security funds for the
public monies held by the three houses, Ono and Shimada became
bankrupt leaving Mitsui the entire exchequer business until the
establishment of the Ilppon Glnko (Bank of Japan) in 1882.
During this time, the informal representation of big
business in politics began with a political friendship beween
the Mitsui house and Inouye Kaoru in the early I8?0 s s. Inouye
was a high official in the finance off-.ce in 1871-1872, the
Minister of Industry in 1878, and Foreign Minister in 1879.
He continued to hold high government offices throughout his lift!
as well as serving as advisor to the Mitsui interests. Because
of the aid it rendered and political connections it had, the
House of Mitsui was permitted to buy at a low price (often
below actual cost) rich sulfur, lead, silver and copper
deposits, the huge Mi ike coal mine and textile mills.
Others besides Mitsui received privileges. In 1870,
Iwasaki Yataro began a shipbuilding and shipping business, and
in I875, founded the great Mitsubishi enpire. To expand trade,
the Meijl government gave him thirteen ships that had been used
to transport troops in the punitive expedition to Formosa in
1874 and, in addition, until 1885, provided a yearly cash
subsidy of just under £250,000. In I885, Iwasaki formed the
Hadley, 3usines s Po w <?r t p e 120.
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Nippon Yusen Kaisha—NYIC (Japanese Mail Steamship Company) and
the government subsidy was increased to about ¥880,000 per year.
In addition, to strengthen the firm, it was made, by legislative
action, the sole military carrier for the government.
As a reward for expanding Japan's trade as well as
benefiting from political connections, Iwasaki Yataro and his
brother, Yanosuke, were permitted to purchase the Nagasaki
shipyards, the Tasashlma coal mine, ths Sado gold mine and the
Ikuno silver &.n<5. copper mine from the government.
Other industrial units were soLd to Sumitomo and
additional houses until the government had divested itself of
the majority of its interests.
With the emergence of Japan as a world power as a result
of victories in both the first Sinc=Japanese War of 1894-95 and
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05* strategic industries grew in
scale and in capital invested. Simultaneously, the great
zalbatsu houses expanded in size, increased the number of their
enterprises ard consolidated their holdings thereby taking the
shape of the modern combines. The controlling families,
closely connected to the government bureaucracy from the early
•'It is interesting to note that the first recorded
joint venture by the zaibajtsu houses occurred in this period
when, in 1906, the South Manchurian Railway Company, which
represented government, Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests, was
established and succeeded to rights formerly held by la.
The C( ny, becoming a center of the Japanese domination of
Manchuria, also controlled the valuable Fushun Coal Mines as
well as the Anshan Iron Works.
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days of the Restoration, were, as Industrialists, becoming a
new power in the political sector of the country. At the same
time, the military was moving into a public position of power
and prestige a3 were the political parties. Through a gradual
process, both groups began supplanting the aging and weakening
Melji oligarchy in the role of national leadership.
Two major political parties dominated the Imperial Die1
for the first four decades of the twentieth century. The
S£^ukai (Association of Political Friends), which had origins
in the 1870* s, was conservative in nature deriving its strength
from rural areas. However, by support from the Mitsui zi tsu,
it also developed a strong urban wing. On the other hand, the
Minseito (Democratic Associates Party) was also conservative
but predominately urban and intellectual in natui It was
supported by the Iwasaki families of tie Mitsubishi za lbat
Historical Perspec tive—The Libera l Era (1914-1931
)
The nearly two decades of liberalism in Japan spawned
an even greater hold on the economy by the zai^atsu. The
World War I boom was characterized by the term naxiJdJa (new
rich) which came into common use. With the expansion of the
economy (which was, in part, due to the acquisition of
Germany's assets in the ?ar East and in part to economic
concessions in China), shlnka zalhatsu (new zalbatsu )
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developed1 and the older houses became wealthier and stronger.
By 1916, Japan had become the world's greatest producer of raw
silk as well as cotton cloth, and was a major producer of
chemicals, dyes and pharmaceuticals.
But the wartime prosperity ended in the depression of
1920 and subsequent industrial recovery was irregular. The
silk and textile industries prospered ci.uickly, becoming again
the largest segment of Japanese manufacturing. Meanwhile,
heavy industry did not revive. Under ^he combined forces of
disarmament negotiations, the devastating earthquake of 1923,
and the world iepression of 1929, it stayed sharply contracted
with a low lev'3l of activity until the mid-1930' s. However,
the diff icultles of the period affected the zalbatsu houses
least* Using the wealth previously accumulated- they invested
heavily in horizontal and vertical integration by buying out
competitors and purchasing sources of raw material production
—
all at depressed prices. Thus, at a time of general depression,
tne zalbatsu actually expanded and Japan, despite fluctuations
in foreign markets, simultaneously expanded its trade and built
one of the largest merchant fleets in the world.
As ana, Ayukawa, Furukawa, Naka.jima, Normura and Okura.
Some conflict, which is mainly based on dates of origin, is
present in the determination of the actual companies
characterized by the term "new za lbatsu . " One school of thouj
calls combines which developed during and immediately subseqv
to the World War I boom "new 2iLlksJ£i\" J "the other school
maintains that these companies developed during the period of
the 1930 's as a result of the quasi-war economy of that
decade. (See Table 1).
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In addition to the above, zaibatsu houses also
increased their political power through the mechanism of a
duallstic industrial economy. One side o.f this dual structure
contained the relatively few zaibatsu who could be
characterized by huge enterprises with thousands of personr
the other side was composed of thousands of medium and small
manufacturing units which mainly used manual production
methods. Tab.'.e 8 shows this pattern over a period of years
from 1920c
TABLE 8
JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL DUALISM 1920, 1930, 1939





















100. 0# 100. 0^
Sources: 1920 and 1930—Hadley, Business Power , p. 301.
1939—-George 0. Allen, Japan H; Economic Expansion .
p. 271.
Many of the smaller enterprises depended on the
zaibatsu combines for credit, orders or marketing channels
(i.e., for their very existence). This dependency relationship
increased the scope of zaibatsu political influence by
broadening the power base to incorporate all elements of the
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stratified society. Not only did the zalbatsu houses materially
assist in financially backing the people it wanted to place in
high positions through the two political parties. Family
relatives were similarly advanced1 since industrialists were
now very acceptable in court circles and intermarriage with the
aristocracy and bureaucracy was common.
In the financial sector, banks had developed into the
chief source of both long- term and short-term working funds for
industry and commerce. Although government banks remained
dominant as an effective and signifies. at instrument of military
and expansionist policies* private bancs such as the Daiiehi
(First), Xasuda, Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi concentrated
on increasing their capital. Over the years they absorbed
smaller banks which had gotten into difficulties in a series
of £ inancial cr is e s
.
The termination of the Liberal Era came suddenly when,
in September 1931, the Japanese Army, after extensive economic
penetration by the government Bank of Ohosen (Korea), staged an
explosion on the South Manchuria n Railway near Mukden and
blamed it on Chinese sabotage. The "Manchurian Incident," as
it was popularly called, gave the Army the excuse it needed to
1Prime Minister Kato Takaaki (1925-26) was the son-in-law of Iwaski lataro, the founder of tl I Ltsubishi hour;.-, kfascinating study has been made of tta and current political-
economic
|
anal relationships by ) a Chitoshi in hi ok,
ln Js
l
; M (Sew Haven: Yale Unii LtyPress, 1968;.
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occupy the country immediately and therefore, before the liben
government could act, it was presented with a fait acconmli.
By December 1931, the "Manchurian Incident" had caused
the Minseito Cabinet to fall and, sines Japanese military
forces occupied all important population centers, in February
1932, the puppet state of Manchuko was established as a
protectorate; a location from which the Army continued its
policy of economic and military infiltration into Mongolia and
North China.
As was previous ly noted, the zaibatsu had aligned
themselves with the two major conservative political parties,
the S^jukai and the Minseito . A synopsis of their effect on
the political stri be se< i am the following;
In the period 193.5-1932, two conservative partylineages were recognized and utilised by the
2£ibatsu as means to power, that is, to influence
the formulation of public policies. The parties
became dependent on them financially, and this
influence was used to obtain national policies
favorable to big business and specific company
interests, to resist agrarian and military elements
when they threatened z-aiba/tsu positions, and to
oppose any broad reforms which might change the
socio-economic structure. 1
However, this arrangement was relatively short-lived. In 1925
,
the Universal Manhood Suffrage Bill gave rise to expressions of
unrest by the farmers and indus
-trial workers which manifested
. .
Allan B. Cole, / 'IM^^^iY^a^^Politics, BostonUniversity Studies in Pol] No. 1 (Boston, Mass.:
The Graduate School of Bos tor; University, 1956), pp. 74-75.
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Itself in the organization of active proletarian political
parties. Thin, in addition to smear tactics used by the
militarists and ultra-nationalists, led to extreme pressure on
"the zaipatsu in the form of condemnation for all political
corruption (a great deal of which they were actually responsible
for)* Since the zaibatou were somewhat aligned (if not
actually, then mentally) with liberal Western influences for
purposes of tiade while still having great power in the
government, it was relatively easy for the right wing to twist
the coin and c iscredit both capitalism and all democratic/
liberal goverrment. As has been succinctly stated:
Here vsas sort of guilt by association, applied
perhaps more to institutions than to individuals.
Greedy capitalists , corrupt politicians, and an
economically menacing but effete Western world were
lumped together in an amorphous but horrible totality,
in which each helped to discredit the others and which
contrasted sharply with the supposed native purity
and selfless loyalty of the military and the
nationalistic fana tic.
1
Smear campaigns, however, had their limitations and a
series of assassinations in 1932 by ultranationalistic groups
with the targets being leading political, bureaucratic,
business figuras as well as moderate Army and Navy leaders,
proved effective. Premier Inukai Ki (isyuoshl), head of the
Seiyukai. was murdered on May 15 (the "5-15 incident") in a
plot engineered by twenty-five young Army cadets and Naval
officers. Also among the top people assassinated at this time
New :
•^Edwin 0. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (j>rd ed.;
r York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1934)7* p. l?oT"
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were a former Minselto finance Minister and Baron Dan Takuma,
chairman of the Mitsui hons ha . Prom this point until the Army-
took complete control in 194-1, Cabinets were run by a
conglomeration of civil and. military boreaucrats who attempted,
without success, to steer a course between the aggressive
expanoionistio policies of the militarists and the tenents of
relative cauti.on promulgated by major zaibatsu.
The trend was definitely towar i more and more military
control with only the efforts of a relative few of the Emperor's
advisers and a power struggle between two factions of the Army,
the Toseiha (Control Group) and the Ko|oha (Imperial Faction).,
delaying the inevitable. It is interesting to note that the
split in the Army did not involve war Dr peace, but only the
direction in which the war would move; the outcome of which
would proroundiy affect xne future of Japan. The Kodoha held
that the Soviet Union was the primary ?nemy of Japan and was to
be attacked as soon as possible, whereas the Toseiha favored
avoiding the Soviets and pushing southward into China. In
1936, passions overrode judgment and in February (the "2-26
incident"), young officers, supported by soldiers of the Tokyo
garrison and some of the Imperial Guard, seized key buildings
in Tokyo and sent assassination squads to eliminate the
opposition. Jn this blood-bath, Finance Minister Takahashl
Korekiyo, Keeper of the Privy Seal Admiral Saito Makoto, and
the Inspector of Military Training and Education, General
Watanabe Jo tar were among the many killed. Although the
government suppressed the rebellion, the incident set the stage
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for leaders of the Toselh a to assume authoritarian control and
direct war efforts toward China (fighting actually began near
Peking on July 7» 1937). Their position was formally
solidified on May 17, 1936, when it was required that the
Ministers of War, Army and the Wavy be selected from active
officers in the armed forces.
Almost immediately subsequent to the violence in 1932,
the zaibatsu began to abandon the political parties and seek
an accommodation with military and right wing bureaucratic
leaders. In existence at that time were over an estimated 500
patriotic and nationalistic societies t among which were the
anti-communist Kokjjhonsha (National Foundations Society), the
Sakurakai (Society of the Cherry) and Kokurvukal (Society of
the Amur River—more commonly known as the Black Dragon
Society) . Although some of them had limited membership (e.g.,-
the Sakurakal was limited to Army officers of the rank of
lieutenant colonel and below), zaibatsu interests were able to
shift their affiliation from one group to another and, if
desired, belong to several societies at one time. This switch
of allegiance from political parties to the more right wing




. • . . the zaibatsu had stood bshiad the parties,
. . . they had also stood behind a strong centralized
government and rigid police control of the people.
They were no more committed to parliamenl
government than to autocracy. Burliness meant far
more to them than political principles. The vast
new field for economic explol I n provided by thi
militarists in Manchuria became, to a large extent,
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the special domain of a newly risen group of
zalbatsu
. but the wars and rearmament programs
of the militarists led to rapid development of
heavy industry and of certain other specialized
war Indus tries to the benefit of all the big
industrialists. The average zalbatsu executive
remained afraid of the risks and expense of a
major war, but he was not averse to cooperating
with the militarists in minor colonial ventures
and in the profits of building an empire. The
militarists for their part, while initially
suspicious or openly hostile toward big business
and capitalism in general, discovered early . . .
that the j could not fully exploit the empire they
were conquering or develop the war industries
they needed without the full and willing
cooperation of big business.
^
Table 9 indicates the extent of the operations of
selected combines in occupied territories and serves to bear
out the cross connection between the zalbatsu and the military
as far as mutual interests were concerned.
The mastery of the political «rts shown by the zalb'
became apparent when, in the early 1930 ! s, Mitsui 's foremost
executive, Ik 3 da Seihin, became Governor of the Bank of Japan
and later Finance Minister. He used his Influence in these
positions, almost exclusively to gain funding for the expansion
of heavy industry. In addition, other zalbatsu members received
top positions in the Ministry of the Imperial Household, the
House of Peers and the Privy Council. Another high political
post, that of Minister of Commerce and Industry, was frequently
filled by a zalbatsu executive or an appointee of the zalbatsu.
Conversely, retired admirals, generals and career bureaucrats
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found high positions in the zaibatsu thus completing the circle
of power and influence.
The period then from 1930-37 showed tremendous
expansion of the Japanese industrial and trading base. The
volume of exports increased 89 percent between 1929 and 1937,
while imports increased by only 30 percent. Although dependent
upon her Imports, (mere than 50 percent of exports required raw
materials which were imported), Japan oecame the world's fourth
largest exporter and had the third largest merchant marine. 1
Table 10 shows the 1935-38 increase/decrease of Industrial
production in terms of a 1931-33 base of 100. Decreases in the
textiles and cement/glass industries which took place between
1937 and 1938, have been attributed to conversion of plants to
.„..„ ^awuuu wi^i* ^.j nexj. «» uio changeover 01 equipment for
the pur-pose of manufacturing machine tools.
In 1937, the government withdrew its previously indulgent
policy toward industry and attempted to subject it to control and
regulation in order to increase production of war material and
channel essential supplies into the war effort. This prompted
a six-year straggle (1937-43) between the zaibatsu and the
military. Thus, while cooperating with the government on one
hand, the MiM-tlE managed to wage a relatively successful
campaign against complete nationalization of industries and los
of their economic and management control. On March 24, 1938,
u. S. Army, U._S
,.
Army Area Handbook for Japan (2nd
ed.; Washington, D. 0.: U. S. Government PrinUnT ice,



































a National General Mobilization Bill was enacted which empowered
the government to "regulate production, distribution, prices,
wages, exports, and imports; to pay subsidies; to build
stockpiles; and to control capital issues."1 This bill also
gave the government authority to mobilize manpower and impose
censorship on public communications channels during emergency
periods. In addition, some industries were nationalized and a
substantial group of "national policy" companies established.
Table 11 details the nationalized and national policy companies.
The latter were, for the most part, owned Jointly by the govern-
ment and private investment although supposedly governed by
relevant ministries. However, "they wore hybrid agencies, In
which much ^batsu capital was invested and managerial personnel
was drawn from the combines rather than from the bureaucracv "2
Their advantages lay in the fact that they were exempt from
taxes for a period of years; able to obtain credit at low rates;,
given special subsidies; the investors were guaranteed a
minimum dividend (usually at least 4 percent); and were of:
granted priority to obtain capital equipment and raw materials.
As was indicat-d in Chapter II, combines Joined together to
economically exploit the rich resources through the median'
of the national policy companies. Since the proclamations of
1Ikid . , p . 656
.
2Bisson, Zalb .'^Mssojjition, p. 13.
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the "New Order In East Asia" and the "Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere" contained provisions for making (under
Japanese economic and political control) the fiupire self-
sufficient, it thereby provided for a wider and firmer economic
base in industrial and trading power. Therefore, the zalbatsu.
while not concurring with some of the :aethodology employed by
the militarists, were in accord with tie general policy and
eager to see military expansion centime.
As in conservative politics, z ilbatsu combines split
military interests. Mitsui became closely associated with Army
Interests while Mitsubishi became tied to the Navy and Merchant
Marine. Shlnfra zalbatsu were mainly aligned with the Army.
In that military budget or expenditure;? (Table 12} represented
SUoh 8 h'c-h nfTrvrilAcft of v^p t.j nnal inr»:>m© cur- tnf.fil «•}•« t.A
expenditures as appropriate, and the services, rather than the
home domestic market, were the prime customers of the zalbatsu .
alignment with a particular service did no harm. This was
especially true due to the immensely b:?oad base from which the
combines operated.
During July and August of 1940, all political elements
were "invited" to dissolve and in October 1940, the Taisei.
Yokusan Kal (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) was
established ae a single mass organization with the role of
uniting the people to the government and its policies. The




JAPANESE MILITARY" EXPENDITURES, 1930-1941
Military Expeticlltures .as %.o£ Total State. Expend Itur e
Fiscal Year Army Navy Tc ta 1
1930 13.09 15.41 28.50
1931 12.89 15.54 28.43
1932 15.40 15.38 30.78
1933 19.16 16.04 35.20
1934 20.52 18.18 38.70
;,o',r 20, 43 2] .5] n -


















family members and executives became leaders of the movement.
*
Since the zalbatsu had now become fully committed to
expansionist policies, they intensified previous Intelligence
activities on behalf of the government in the non-military
areas (e.g., political, economic and psychological).
S. A* Francaise Bussan (Mitsui Trading's
French correspondent) . . . issued a daily report
entitled 'Information de Paris" which ranged from
one to twenty pages. The . . . person writing
this report read all the great French dailies and
also certain Italian papers in preparation.
Magazines including scientific 3 ou:£na l s were also
systematically reviewed for it. While the . . .
(report) «. . . mentioned whatever military data
appeared in the press and journals or came the
company's way, the bulk of the report dealt with
such subjects as industrial capacity, inventions,
labor (particularly strikes) and political
developments. 2
However, intelligence activities were not confined to Europe.
The following ei vrcr^ extracted from correspondence
originated by the San Francisco branch of Mitsubishi Trading:
Date: 7 August 1939
To: The Seattle Branch Office
In view of the fact that the Development
Department,, Tokyo, recently requested us to send
as much reports on subjects of interest . • .
,
it is our mutual desire to make these reports
originating in your office, as well as this office,
as complete*, as possible. . . . I therefore propose
the following arrangement for the future in regard




1Later, in May 1942, the Tais ei Yokusan Sgiii^Kai
(Imperial Rule Assistance Political AssociationT was formed as
a complimentary organization, to operate specifically in the
political areas in behalf of the war effort. As was the case
in the parent organization, zalbatsu members became leading
figures in this movement.




(a) lour office shall report on material
gathered from your local newspapers and what you
hear locally in your territory only.
(b) This office shall report from our local
news materials . . . , the "Wall Street Journal
(Pacific Coast Edition)" and also on materials
from national newspapers and magazines.-**
Date: 7 Juris 1941
To: Manager, Fuel Department, Huad Office, Tokyo
Sub,J: Conpetitive Bulk Oil Shipment from Los
Angeles Harbor
One striking thing noticed in the list (of
oil shipments) aside from purely our business
standpoint is the fact that a largo amount of fuel
and diesel fuel oils and gasoline ;,n a minor degree
are being shipped from (the) California Coast to
Pearl Harbor, T. H. . . . There must have been
shipment of similar materials going out of San
Francisco Bay and possibly from Es - ;ero Bay to
Pearl Harbor during the same period. 2
By 1941, industry had expended enormously.
The production of machine tools totaled over
46,000, more than double that of l c '37» and at the
enn of the vear Japan hac! a niachin? tool inventory
of 689,163 units—a stock which was 65 percent of
the United States' inventory. The motor vehicle
industry was producing 48,000 units a year, and the
aircraft industry was turning out ever 5*000 air-
planes, 5
In addition, over 462,700 tons of new ship construction were
launched that year. + Zaibatsu concerns were heavily committed
to this effort, as can be seen from Chart VII which details, in
terms of paid-in capital, the positions of the combines relative
1 Ibld
. < pp. 348-349.
2Ibid ., p. 348.
JU. S. Army, Area Handbook , p. 657
.
Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Eco nomy in War and


















































to each other and to the economy as a whole during the years
1937, 1941 and 1946. A detailed study 'of the percentages
involved shows; the striking growth of zaibatsu power during the
war years and in particular, the major combines ("Big Four").
Whereas during; the period 1937-1941, growth of all zaibatsu
groups was roughly equal, the Pacific War brought prodigious
advances to the older and more powerful zaibatsu. These
figures then serve to complete the connection between the older
combines and J ;he military, proving that, despite differences in
adoption of a means to the end, the conbines, on the basis of
increasing economic power and profits, did support the extra-
territorial designs of the military.
The aforementioned six year struggle between the
military and the zaibatsu for internal economic power came to a
head in 1943 when the zaibatsu staged what amounted to a sit-
down strike.
If the Army-Navy Airforce General Headquarters
were to irsist on retain administrative control
over an expanded aircraft production progr; ..
involving complete mobilization of the industrial
giants of the Japanese economy, the- . . .
Tz§JU imply not interested. They
became willing to play ball when the administrative
authority was vested in a , . . Ministry (which
would bo) controlled by their men a.nd operated
within the framework of . . . (legislation) to
which they subscribed,
The results of these tactics came to fruition on November 1,
1943 t when the Munitions Ministry (staffed by zaibatsu
^•Thomas A, Bisson, "Increase of Zaibati u Predominance




executives) was created and, in early 1944, a Munitions Company
Act was passed containing carefully drawn provisions which
secured the necessary centralization of administrative control,
while at the same time, maintained the essentials of private
control of management functions.
With the commencement of massive incendiary and
saturation bombing in November 1944, the zaibatsu. contrary to
previous patterns, attempted to obtain nationalization of
industries to defray expenses incurred in repair/reconstruction
and to control rising unrest among ind is trial workers. With
few exceptions, the government would not support this policy,
but did establish compensation payment plans for war damage.
Dissention amcng the workers was held In check by the passage,
early in 1945, of a National Labor Mobilization Law.
The successive military losses along with the heavy
bombing which culminated in the atomic bombs dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki laid the "New Order in East Asia" to
ruin and, "in the end, the zaibatsu were the victims of the
system they helped to create."
^Quotation by William W. Lockwood from his book. The
Economic Developme nt of Japan, as extracted from Cole,
Japanese Society and Politics , p. 77.

CHAPTER IV
THE OCCUPATION ERA (1945-1952)
Introduction
In the. seven years of Allied occupation, the most
radical changes to the then existing Japanese social, political
and economic £ tructures occurred. With a view toward, under-
standing these changes as a basis upon which the current
Japanese political-economic philosophy rests, the chapter will
closely examine the attitudes and events leading to the
dissolution oi
.
the zalbatjsu. purges of top business executives,
in American policy toward Japan, and the short-range effects of
occupation reforms as they affected large business groups.
Background
When General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), landed at Japan's Atsugl
Airfield on August 30, 1945, he found a nation whose economy
was completely shattered and whose major cities had been
devas -bated by bombing. By July of 1945,
. . . the economic basis of Japanese resistani
had been destroyed. . . . .Electric power and coal
consumption were exactly 50 percent of the peak
reached in 1944 ; . t . overall industrial output
was approximately 40 percent of the 1944 peak; (and)
serviceable merchant tonnage was a little over 12




war. Output of airframes had fallen 56 percent
from the 1944 peak; aircraft engines 73 percent;
merchant shipbuilding 81 percent; army ordnance
44 percent; and Naval ordnance 57 percent. . . .
Oil refining had declined to 15 percent of the
1943 output (and) . „ . aluminum production was
only 9 percent of the 1944 peak. 1
However; the reductions in industrial cutput were not primarily
caused by bomb destruction, but rather by a lack of raw
materials created by an effective American blockade of Japan.
The Japanese dependency on imported rav materials was succinctly
expressed by tie Japanese themselves wi en, in 1943 » the Greater
East As is Ministry admitted that "should there ever come a time
when supplies of raw materials are cut off, we cannot but
predict that tie continuation of this uodern war will become
almost impossible." Again, in 1945, 3n analyzing the effects
ox ux"uct..i axea Dumoxxig uu \ uu@; oapaut: se war c ecc
a committee from Tokyo Imperial University stated;
Before the first heavy strategical air raid
started, tie . . . (industrial) production of
Japan had already been thrown into a desperate
condition by the effective ocean blockade by the
Allied forces. . . . According to the data of the
economic mobilization plan which can be regarded
as an index-number to the economic strength of our
country, Japan was forced to the verge of collapse
in the third quarter of 1944.





5 Ibid., p. 58.
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However, the real effect of the bombing was felt elsewhere in
Japan.
Nowhere was the urban air attack inore effectivethan itc impact upon the civilian sector of theeconomy
.
.
m the 66 towns attacked, approxi-mately 50 percent of the housing favilities






by air attak wiile anadd?!ioSal
S
1 , were torn down by the Japanese themselves
... to clear firebreaks.
. . . Thus
. . .
thT~wn JfJ7 22 ^}} lon Japanese or 30 percent ofhe civilian population were routed out oV theirestablished homes. 1
Although what remained of Japan's manufacturing
capability immediately subsequent to the termination of
hostilities was outmoded or worn down, Allied authorities
estimated that: 2
a. Heavy production machinery was 73 percent
usable.
U Sauxc.
c. Pracision production machinery was 88percent usable.
d. Automobile production equipment "did not
sustain major damage from air raids."
e. Railroad rolling stock production equipment
(1) Locomotives was 72 percent usable
(2) Passenger and electric cars was 70
percent usable
(3) Freight cars was 82 percent usable.
f. Communications production capability was10 percent,
g. Wire and cable production capability was
oO percent,,
h. Electrical equipment production capability
was 55-65 percent.
1
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Occupa tion JSoonomlo Policies
The initial policies upon which SCAP actions were based
started in an outpouring of bitterness toward Japan and tho
ensuing confusion of the surrender finally manifested itself in
a primary desire to disarm Japan, completely destroy any
potential for war still existing, and to exact reparations in
repayment for Japanese aggression. In a radio address,
President Harry S. Truman said, "The evil done by the Japanese
warloards can never be repaired or forgotten. But their power
to destroy and kill has been taken froz them.' As an extension
of these thoughts, initial occupation policy was designed to
. « «, insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and
security of the world. . . . The existing economic
basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed
and not t>( ' 6 to revive = .. To this
It shall ba the policy of the Supreme Commander . . .
to favor a program for the dissolution of the large
industrial and banking combinations which have
exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade
and industry.
The poLicies of Japan have brought down upon the
people greit economic destruction and confronted them
with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering.
The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own
behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the
burden of .repairing the damage. 2
-'•Harry S. Truman, "Radio Address Coincident with
Surrender Ceremonies, September 1, 194-5," as published in the
U* S. Department of State, Occupation o f Japan (Publication
2671, Par JSastorn Series 17', Washington, D. C: Government
Printing Office, 1946), p. 6.5.
2U. S. Department of State, War and Navy, United Stg
.Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan as publishedTIn the
U. S„ Department of State, Occupation of Japan, pp t 78-79.
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On November 1, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave
direction to SOAP as follows:
It is the intent of the United States Govern-
ment to encourage and show favor to:
a. Policies which permit a wide distribution
of income and of ownership of the means of
production and trade.
b. The development of organizations in labor.
Industry, and agriculture organized on a democratic
basis.
Accordingly, you will:
1. Require the Japanese to establish a public
agency responsible for reorganizing Japanc
business in accordance with the military and
economic objectives of your government. You will
require this agency to submit, for approval by you*
plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial
and banking combines or other large concentrations
of private business control.^
You will not assume any responsibility for the
economic rehabilitation of Japan or the >igthen-
ing of the Jap; i economy. You will make it
clear to the Japanese people that you me no
ob.V 1 - tio~i to maintain an'"- ^art-' "'^ c*^
living j.n Japan.
~
The A],lies chose to primarily reduce Japan's war-making
potential by exacting reparations. To this end, President
Truman appointed Edwin W. Pauley as his representative on
reparations. On March 1, 1946, the Pauley Report, among other
th ings , urg e d tha 1
:
The Allied Powers should take no action to
assist Japan in maintaining a standard of living
higher than that of neighboring Asiatic countries
injured by Japanese aggression.
. , . Under this
principle, a broad view should be taken of the
economy, and especially of the varying degree of
''y(^y,is.<-: i >'•-::/ y",v ' —V > r ,
;
..g published ±33 BiSSOn,
Zalbatsu .Dissolution, p , 240
.
2




industrialization of Eastern Asia as a whole.
The overall aim should be to raise and to even
up the level of industrialization. This alia can
be served by considered allocation, to different
countries j, of industrial equipment exacted from
Japan as reparations . Reconstruction is an urgent
need of all the countries against which Japan
committed aggression. Reconstruction is also
needed in Japan. In the overall comparison of
needs, Japan should have the last priority.
(The) ralbatsu . « . are the greatest v;ar
potential of Japan. It was they w.io made possible
all Japan's conquests and aggressiDns. . . .
Unless the Z3.iba.tsu are broken up, the Japanese
have little prospect of ever being able to govern
themselves as free men. As long as the zalbatsu
survive, Japan will be their Japan, 1
As a result of the initial hard-line policy, Japanese
industrial recovery during the first years of the occupation
was slow, with production, by 1947 » only 40 percent of a 1930-
1934 base^ which was only slight],y higher than it was when the
war endea.
Zalbatsu Dissolution
With regard to the zail
. . . there was no difference of opinion among
the Allies about the desirability of economic
deconcentratlon in Japan. Differences concerned
only what should replace Japan's system of private
collectivism. The United States wanted free
private competitive enterprise, and under the
circumstances, this policy prevailed. Host
broadly put, . . . (this) called for removal of
^ Q zalbatsu families from their position of
business r and severing the tles-»ownership,
personnel, credit, contracts—which bound the
Edwin w. Pauley, Tt on Japanese, Reparatio ns to the
President of the Un ited StatesTuT s7 Department of State
Publication 3174, "Far Eastern Series 25* Washington, D. G.:
Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 6-7, 39-40,
2U.S. Army, Are fc, p. 659. Although later
abandoned, the Allies had agreed that the average 3 trial
production for the years 1930-1934 should be used as a base for
determining Japanese peacetime requirements.
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component corporations into combine structures.
Proposed, but essential!.}'- abandoned, was an effort
to split up certain of the giant operating
companies of the combines.
The aim of the Allied . . . program was to give
all Japanese businessmen the opportunity to engage
in the modern sector of the economy, that is, to
remove those conditions which in fact made it a
private collectivism. The aim was to broaden the
basis of ownership in the modern sector from a
handful of business families of giant fortunes to
ownership by the many. . . . (The goals) were
conceived not in idealism but because political
democracy in Japan was regarded as essential to the
security Interests of the Allies, and because
political democracy and economic dsmocracy were
viewed as inextricably related. 1
Combine deconcentration took tiree major forms i first,
the broadening of the ownership base by severing current owner-
ship ties via confiscation of stock, dissolution and/or reor-
ganization of specific companies; second, the severing of
personnel ties; and third, the passage of major legislation witi
regard to monopoly and deconcentration.. Immediate action was
initiated by SOAP when, on October 22, 1945, SOAP IN 177*"
directed that fifteen designated zaiba-;su holding companies,
within forty-five day's, submit data on their complete financial
and asset structure as well as on that of their subsidiaries.
Shortly thereafter (October 31, 1943 ), SOAPIN 215 stated that
"no sale, trade, or other transfer or adjustment of the capital
stocks, bonds, debentures, voting trust or other forms of
capital securities' could be made without prior approval of
Hadley, Antitrust, pp. 10-11, 19.
^SOAPIN is an acronym for "SOAP Instruction."
•^Iwao Hoshii, Japan f s Business Concentration (Orient/
West, Publishers, 196977 p. 4.
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SOAP by the fifteen designated zalbatsu holding companies. The
directive went on to. say that the same restriction applied to
"any corporation, partnership or stock company" in which they
"hold any stock or other evidences of ownership, indebtedness
or control, or directly exercise any power of management or
direction."1
In the meantime, Japanese Finance Minister Shibusawa
Keizo had beer involved with the four major zalbatsu (Mitsui,
Sumitomo , Yasuda and Mitsubishi) with regard to dissolution.
Of the voluntary plans recommended, the one by Yasuda was
acceptable and, on November 4, 1945, it was submitted by
Sibusawa to SCAP. Two days later, SCAPIN 244 approved the plan
with some modifications. Under the Japanese proposal (known
as the Yasuda Plan), the Mitsui Honsha, Yasuda Honzensha,
Sumitomo Honsha and the Kabushlki Kalsha Mitsubishi Honsha
were to transfer "all securities owned by them and ail other
evidences of ownership or control of any interest in any firm,
corporation or other enterprise" to a Holding Company
Liquidation Commission (HCLG), which was to be established.
The HCLG was to rapidly liquidate all assets by sale of
securities to the public with preference of purchase being given
to company employees. However, the quantity of shares purchased
•'•Blsson, Zalbatsu Dissolution, p. 81.
o
Ibid
. . p. 241. Bisson presents the complete text of
the "Yasuda Plan' and SCAPIN 244 as Appendix 2,
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by any individual would be limited and neither the holding
company itself nor any members of the controlling families would
be able to make any purchases. Upon completion of the liquida-
tion, the former owners were to receiva the amount tendured in
interest bearing (later agreed upon to be 3 percent) govc lt
bonds, with a maturity of not less than ten years and which
were "non-negotiable, non-transferable except by inheritance,
and ineligible for use as collateral."1 in addition, family
members would resign immediately from any business positions
held and immediately subsequent to the transfer of ownership to
the HCLC, the directors and auditors would also" resign all
offices held by them in the holding con.pany.
To the above, SOAP added the following major provisions:
1. The government was to immediately freeze
the controlling familii
2. The government was to submit "plans forthe dissolution (of other) industrial, commercial,financial and agricultural combines.' 1
3. The government was to present its programfor enacting laws as will eliminate and preventprivate monopoly and restraint of trade, undesir-
able inter. Lng directorates, undesirable inter-
corporate security ownership and assure the






On December 8, 1945, SCAP issued two more primary
directives. The first, SCAPM 403, specifically listed 18
holding companies and 336 subsidiaries and affiliates in a
"Schedule of Restricted Concerns" which banned security
1Ibid .. p. 242.
2Ibid . . p 6 244,
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transactions on their part. From this total of 354 companies,
the Schedule was modified several times so that a new total of
1203 holding companies, subsidiaries and affiliates were
eventually 11b ted, A complimentary order, SCAPIN 403, directed
that the assets of "restricted companies" be controlled so as
to prevent dissipation.
Since all SOAP directives had to be applied through
the mechanism of Japanese law and enforced by the Japanese
themselves, several legal instruments came into being to
facilitate dissolution actions. The first of these was
entitled an "Ordinance Concerning Restrictions on the
Dissolution of Companies" (Ordinance No. 657 » November 20,
1945) which backed up SCAPIN 403 and 408 and froze the assets
of all "restricted firms" and prohibitad the reorganization of
companies that were dissolved. On April 20, 1946, Imperial
Ordinance 233 * established the HCLC and, to facilitate disposal
of securities, a lav* (No. 8) was enacted on January 17, 1947
which established a Securities Coordinating Liquidation
Committee (SOLO).
The HCLC designated 83 firms as holding companies and
split them into two major groups, a dissolution group and a
reorganization group, primarily based upon the type of holding
company (pure or mixed). By the end of 1947, 16 companies
were completely dissolved and went out of existence; 26 were
dissolved after forming into successor companies; 11 were not
dissolved but formed successor companies; and 30 remained





HCLC ACTIONS ON DESIGNATED "COMPANIES
Group I—'Compa nies dissolved
Second compenies not established
Second companies established
Group II— Comranles not dissolved






Source: JBisscn, Zaibat.su Dissolution, p. 113.
During; the course of events the HCLC received a total
value of 7,53--, 655,875 yen in stocks and bonds of the 83
holding companies previously mentioned and the 56 designated
"




















The original data showed a grand total of
7,571,655,876 but has been corrected for mathematical errors
and rearranged.
Source: HCLC, Japanese Zaibatsu and their Dissolution, p. 289





By November 1949, of the total of 165,673,117 shares
of stock received by the HCLC, 113,324,000 had been sold for
8,364,403,000 yen and when the disposal was complete in June
1951 j the net proceeds were 9,600,000,000 yen. Table 15 shows
sales from June 1947 through October 1949 and Illustrates that
there were other government programs involved with the sale of
stock other than Just the HCLC.
Under the capital levy tax of October 1946,
payment of an extraordinary tax was permitted in
kind. Accordingly, the Finance Ministry held stock
which neex.ed to be disposed of to the publico There
was also a disposal program because of stock held in
other corporations by "closed institution"
. . .
(which) were corporations that had been integrally
involved in Japan's program of expansion ... or
in controlling allocation and distribution in the
wartime economy, such as the myriai control
companies and
. . . associations, Finally, there
was a securities disposal program under the Anti-
monop< 3 Law supervised bv the PTC (Fair 'ir^c,
•
' 1 vw iiiiii j. a S3 JLW iJ / « ""'\,'w
Personnel Purge
The objective of the SCAP personnel purge was, as
stated in JOS Directive 1380/15 of November 1, 1943, "to
eliminate all persons who have been active exponents of
militant nationalism and aggression." - To this end, paragraph
23 of the Directive specified that "in the absence of evidence
• . . to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who
have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in
industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active
^Hadley, Ajrtitrust, p c 181.
p





SECURITIES DISTRIBUTED BY THE SECURITIES
COORDINATING AND LIQUIDATION COMMISSION
June .1947 to November 1945








































Source: Had ley, Antltruqjt, p. 188
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exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. "^ Thus, on
January 4 y 1946. SCAFIN 550 was promulgated which covered
purges in the political, governmental and military sectors.
However, it was later modified to include the strict
provisions of paragraph 23- In total, 1,966 persons, as shown
in Table 16, were purged under the economic sections of this
order.
To fill in gaps left by SCAPIfi 550 and to "eradicate
(the) personal tie- which has served influentially for the
formation and maintenance of the zalbatsu enterprises, "^ on
January 7, 19 z -8 } the Japanese government declared the "Law for
Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control" (Law -Wo. 2). The law
called for retirement of all zaibatsu family members who were
then "for ten years . . . (to) be excluded from positions of
officials in
. . .
(the particular combine) and . • .
prohibited frcm conducting any activities which belong to the
3
competence authorized only for officials in such companies.'
The same conditions applied to top executives (i.e., directora,
staff members with executive responsibility* auditors, and
advisers with equal or greater authority or influence) who
held positions prior to September 2, 19^5. There is a wide
disparity between source data figures as to the number of
3- lbli ,
^Quotation from Article 1, Law for Termination of
| ba tsu Family Co ntr n 3 (Law No. 2, January 7, 19^8 FluT"
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Under the provisions of Uiia category, axx, specified
key officers who resigned or were "out of office" at the time
of the purge were designated as failing within the provisic
of SCAPIN 550. If such an officer wished to appeal his case,
he could do so within a 30 day period. If appeal was not made,
he was purged by "provisional designation."
Sources ? Combined data from Bisson, Zalbatsu Dissolution ,
p. 155 and.Hadley, Ant i trust"! pp. 92-93^
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people actually purged under Law llo . 2. Because the writer is
unable to reconcile these sources to come up with a valid
composite figure, Table 17 presents both extremes.
TABLE 17










Note: This may not have taken into account those persons
already purged under SOAPIIJ 550, resigned, retired or
dead.







Latent appointees, resigned or
retired 1931 to 1945
Removed by SOAPIIJ 550
Deceased
Net additional officers purged
Of the 101 disapproved exceptions, only 40 were
actually removed with the remaining 61 temporarily retained.
Therefore, the net results of Law No. 2 were, in reality, the
purging of 40 officers,,




Two pieces of major economic legislation came from the
occ h had far-reaching effects on the Japanese
economy. First, on April 14, 1947. an antimonopoly law, the
"I»a g to (the) Prohibition of Private Monopolies and
the Maintenance of Fair Trade" (Law No. 54), was enacted.
Second, a de concentration law, called the "Law for the
JBli '.ion of .Excessive Concentration of Economic Power" (Law
No. 207) , was promulgated on December 18, 1947.
The.„.An timo.t •- Law
Law No. 54 was based upon a draft proposal submitted to
the Japanese ;. rnment by the Anti-Trust Division of the U. S.
Justice Depar t and, when enacted, was "patterned after the
PederJ e Commission Act and the Clayton (Anti-Trust) Act. ,,J "
It consisted of ten chapters incorporating 114 articles. The
objectives of the act are found in Article 1 as follows J
This Law, by prohibiting private monopolization,
unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair methods
of competition,
-hy preventing excessive concentra-
tion of -: • over enterprises, and by excluding
undue restrictions of production, sale, price,
technology, etc., through combinations and' agree-
ats, etc., and all other unreasonable restraints
of business activities, alms to promote free and
fair competition, to stimulate the initiative of
entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities of
enterpriser, j to heighten the levels of employment
and national income and, thereby, to pr< i the
democratic and wholesome deve] int of national
economy ; i ell a^ to assure the interest of the
(jreneral consumer. 2
1
Yamamura, Economic Policy., p, 10.
clbld .. Appendix IV, ramamura presents the first six
chapters of Ui\? No. 54 both in its original wording and also in
the wording changed by the 1953 amendment.
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Because of the law's relative importance, the substantive
portions of the legislation are summarized in Appendix II.
During the occupation period, there was one major
revision to the antimonopoly law. On .January 18, 1949, an
amendment (Law No. 214) was enacted which: 1
n
1. Kcrrowed the definition of the term
'competition' to mean either "supplying the same
or similar goods or services to the same
customers or- consumers" or "receiving supply of
the same cr similar goods or services from the
same supplier.
"
2. Deleted the prohibition from one company's
owning in excess of 25 percent of mother company's
debentures
.
3. Changed the .FTC review of security .trans-
actions to one which was after the fact vice
before it.
4. Relaxed the provisions regarding mergers
and interlocking directorates.
5. Deleted the clause in Article 6 which had
prohibited entering "an (international) agreement
or contract relating to restriction on exchange of
£ q 1 3 H"fc3 *"*
*
}
> C Q ' ' * S c£* ' 4 aa] . I ... . / .. .- . .7., . «
tion necessary for business activities."
DecpnceDtratlon Law
On December 18, 1947, a deconcentration law (Ho. 207)
was executed. The rationale for the ls.w was stated in a SCAP
news release published in the Hippon ..Times the same day, which
said I
Its broad intention is to establish a
reasonable basis for competition and freedom of
enterprise through the elimination of those
concentrations of economic power which stifled
efficiency as well as freedom.
. . . It is
essential to recognize that this De concentration
Law is not Intended to hamper large-scale
production or to prevent efficiently integrated
"Bisson, Zalbatsu Dissolution, pp. 188-190.
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enterprises. . . . Likewise it should be clear
that the - . . Law does not establish any maximum
or minimum size for business enterprises and it
is to be administered by weighing carefully the
actual facts characterizing each company affected
by the Law.-**
The essence of the law was contained in Articles 3 and
6. Article 3 defined
... an excessive concentration of economic
power • . . as any private enterprise conducted
for profit, or combination of such enterprises.
i hich by reason of its relative size in any lice
or in the cumulative power of its position in many
lines, restricts competition or impairs the
opportunity for others to engage in business




Article 6 stipulated that the H0L0 wou.\d malie standards fox-
determining what would constitute "excessive concentration"
based upon consideration of certain defined criteria,
(Apt>en< III} •
Subsequently, the HGLC published two public notices,
the first on February 8, 194-9 which specified its rules of
procedure, and the second on the same day, which enumerated
standards to be applied in determining excessive concentra-
tions.
In July 1948, SOAP, through the HCLO, excluded the
former zalbatsu banks from the provisions of Law 207, giving as
a reason that the banks had been segregated from the holdl"
*4iadley, Antitrust, pp. 110-111.
^Quotation from Article 3* Law 207, as presented in its
entirety in Appendix 5 of Bisson, Zaibatsu X/issolu :
pp. 262-268
.
^Complete texts of HOLC Public Notices No. 1 and Ko. 2
appear as a
:
Ices 6 and 7,. respectively, in Bisson,
Zaiba bsu D3 ution.
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companies which were being reviewed under the anti-monopoly act,
They also announced that the provisions of the law *ould not be
put into effect until after a board from the U. S. had reviewed
the law in terms of the condition of the economy. The Review
Board, chaired by Joseph V c Robinson, arrived in Japan on
May 4, 1943 and on September 11 issued four principles to be
followed during the implementation of the deconcentratior, .law;
1. No order should be issued under the , , .
law unless there is a showing of a prima fac '
case that the company restricts competition or
impairs opportunity for others to engage in
business. In the absence of such a showing, the
company should be removed from designation.
2. Mere possession of nonrelated lines of
business is not in itself sufficient in any case
to establish that a company was an excessive
concentration under Law Eo. 207.
3c Submission of a voluntary plan of
reorganization is not in itself sufficient to
under Law No. 207.
4. The action a company is ordered to take by
the HCLO under Law Wo. 207 should be directly
related to the facts upon which that company was
determined to be an ej^cessive concentration. ^
Table 18 shows the final results of deconcentratlon
actions as taken by the HCLO under the provisions of Law No.
207. In 1950, and within the framework of certain prior
enactments, the HOLC was divested of responsibility and its
functions transferred to the FTC.
American Policy Reorientation
American policy had made some dramatic changes over the
years of the occupation and spanned the gulf between concepts
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One coal mining and one metal mining
company.
Three pulp and paper mfg. companies.
Two can manufacturing companies.
One machinery and two shipbldg. cos,
One coal mining and one metal
mining company.
One coal mining and one metal mining
company.
One rayon and two flax companies.
Two iron and steel companies.
Two textile and one trading company.
Two breweries.


















Disposal of stocks and unexploited
mine lots.
Divided intc nine private companies





*Actually divided in 1951 after the HCLC was divested
oi responsibility and the functions turned over to the FTC.
Source: Bisson, Zalbatsu Dlssolul 149*
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of r-;lament and the resumption of massive industrial recovery-
efforts. The first indication of a shift in policy came in the
controversy over the results of a report made by a State-War
Kiss ion on Japanese Combines led by Corwin D. Williams. The
Mis l, after a ten week investigation, made its report which
was, in a large measure, incorporated into an American policy
paper by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWKCC).
The policy was subsequently forwarded to both SCAP as an
interim directive, and, in October 1949? to the Far Eastern
Commission (JPiJO). In the latter organization, the policy
became known as FEC-230. As part of its normal action, SCAP
used the strong provisions contained in FJ3C-230 to create what
turned out to be the deconcentration law (NO. 207
s 1947).
However, after vigorous legislative debate, the U. 3., on
March 12, 1946, withdrew its support f::om FEO-230, thereby
leaving SCAP in a politically embarrassing position which
called for imrrediate modifications to the Japanese law.
A further example of the change in philosophy, and
thereby policy, was exemplified by the Draper-Johnson Mission
which investigated broad economic problems in Japan and Korea.
Reporting on April 26, 1948, the Committee (known as the
Johnson Committee) recommended that war reparations be reduced
and that large dollar grants be made to -Japan so as to make
"available the initial imported materials required to augment
production quickly. ul With regard to dissolution actions, the
Report to the Secretary of the Army, "Report on the
Boom Position and Prospects of Japan and Korea and the
Measu :equlred to : ove Them," (Johnson Committee"
report). April 26, 1948, as extracted from Bisson, Zaibatsu




The period of uncertainty caused by this
economic reform .should be made short and the area
of uncertainty lessened as rapidly as possible.
The possible disturbing effects should be allayed
by care net to hurt production, and by limit:',
reorganization to the minimum necessary to insure
reasonable competi tion. This we understand is the
intention of the occupation authorities and is
further assured by their establishment of an
American review board-1- to see that deconcentration
plans do not adversely affect production and the
broad program to achieve economic recovery. Care
must also be taken that breaking up the zalbats u
monopolies does not lead to the growth of"
governmental monopolies.
2
SCAP policy fc llowed this change by tapering off the pressure
on the Japanese government with regard to economic reforms.
The Japanese, quick; to respond to the new freedom, did so by
virtually emasculating the Anti-Monopoly Law (No. 54) by their
1949 amendment.
mi. - _•_„ * „ .Li ir _i_ 4 i <- ., 1 j ~ ««. j T ~ -^
jliiiz Cilauge j.ii uue u. u « pn j.xvoi.»jjiA
ty uwwa.ru v apdij k<3.»
manifested by cany things, and, not the smallest among them
was the "cold war." By 1947, not only were differences between
the U, S. and the Soviet Union reaching gigantic proportions,
but -'die U. S. -China policy of support for the Nationalists w
in question,. Since the Kuomintang Army had suffered many
defeats at the hands of the communists despite massive American
aid, and the Nationalist government was riddled with open
corruption, t partment began to realign its thoughts
concerning Japan. The results were, that
lrrhe "American review board" turned out to be the one
chaired by Joseph V. Robinson, as previously referred to in the
text.
23isson, Zalbatsu Dissolution, p. 144.
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. . . by the end of the second year of the
occupation, (the Pentagon) began to propose
that' Japan be promoted from "ex-enemy to
partner. Ex-enemy and partner call for quite
different policies. With a partner one is
concerned only with its foreign policies.
With Japan as an ex-em the U. !5 . and its
allies were worried abou in1 1
political forces that had produced the foreign
expansion.
1
The loss of China in 1949 to communist control, and the outbreak:
of the Korean War on June 25 , 1950, proved this change to be
effective logic.
Another basis for the shift in policy toward Japan lay
in the area of the financial costs to the U. S e for the
rehabilitation. For the period commencing in September 1945
and ending January 31* 1950, the government had given Japan aid
2in food, fertilizer and industrial raw material as follows:






Whereas the U. S. military were in favsr of this aid as it
helped build the Japanese economy, thereby resisting communism,
U. S. political pressure was against it in that, in accordance
with the original occupation policy, Japan was to be responsible
for its own economic revival,. If then, the aid programs were in
political jeopardy, the only real alternative left from a




p. ] 33 and footnote 11, p . 144.
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foreign policy aspect, was to permit and foster the continued
existence of established and large Japanese industrial concerns
The last major area which forced the change in policy-
was that of politics and was based upon the American concepts
of fair play with its framework in the provisions of the U", S.
Constitution. The public debate which had preceded the U t S.
withdrawal of support of its own policy, PEO-230, had been
bitter and stressed the fact that the government was dis-
regarding the sanctity of private property by arbitrary and
quasi-legal means. This struck a responsive chord in the
political sector and gave a mutual anti-authoritarian platform
to both liberal and conservative politicians. Also involved
closely in the political area and complimenting the FJ3C-230
controversy was the purge program. Whsreas it was relatively-
easy to find a rationale for the purge of Japanese militarists
and ultra-nationalists, it was not easy to apply the same
rationale to top business executives. Therefore, the economic
purge of personnel and the forced dives ture of stock, came
under a great deal of public criticism , The feeling that
prevailed could be summarized by saying that
. . . this kind of disqualification (purge) by
legislative or administrative measures would
certainly be considered incompatible with basic
democratic postulate of due process of law, and
the legality of ordering individuals to divest
themselves of certain types of property whose
possession (was) otherwise legal, (was) open to
grave doubts. 1
J-Hoshii, Business Coi bration . p. 6.
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The effects of the deconcentra tlon program are still a
subject of much debate among students of the Japanese economy.
Although Table 19 summarizes the short-range effects, it neither
gives an indices as to the impact on the Japanese economy nor
does it tell cf the longer range results. These results will
be taken up In Chapter V.
With the lessening of SOAP pre??sure and a new emphasis
on rehabilitation of industry, the years 1948-1952 produced a
vastly expanded Japanese economy. In 1.948, because most
industrial activities needed repair or modernization, and there
were no reserve funds to pay for this, the Japanese government
was authorized to use the proceeds fron the disposition of
items imported under the U. S. aid programs for that purpose.
By the end of the year, despite a growing inflation. waj?
an upward turn in industry. To curb the inflation and thereby
pave the way for Japan's reemergence as: a ma;] or world trading
nation, the Dodge Plan1 was introduced by SCA? which, through
the mechanisms of balancing the national budget, retirement of
debt, discontinuance of government lending, reduction of
subsidies and the establishment of a unitary rate of exchange
at 360 yen to one U. S. dollar, proved effective. The slight
recession which was created by the application of the
deflationary measures was offset when the Korean War (June 1950}
moved the economy into a period of boom.
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Note? Data have been modified to agree with previously
presented information.
Source: Rearranged fron ley, Antitrust , p. 443.
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The termination of the Korean War boom in the spring of
1951 did not contract the expansion of Japan's industrial
production. Because the purchase of equipment, supplies and
services, as well as money spent on amusements for the U. S.
and U. J\T . troops was maintained at a high level, it provided
the income necessary to procure capital equipment. This, in
turn, closed "he wide gap between Japan's technology and that
of the West. The magnitude of industrial production changes
from a period 1934-1952 is shown on Table 20.
The occupation ended April 28, 1952 under the terms of
the peace treaty signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951.
From the point of view of American democratization efforts, it
could be said of the occupation—
"
Mitsureba kakuru nvo no nari—
-*•
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THE CHANGING PAGE OP JAPAN (1952-1969)
Introduction
In preceding chapters the structure of the zalbat.su has
been presented as well as its origin and development througj
World War II. During the initial years of the occupation
following the war, a major effort was made to democratize the
economic sector in Japan by destroying the zalbatsu power
structure-- the major holding companies, the stock ownership
base, and selected top personnel. In addition, strong
deconcentration and antimonopoly legislation nas enacted with
the dual objectives of applying maximum pressure during the
occupation period itself and preventing a reoccurrence of i
zaibatsu in the future.
In this chapter, after establishing a perspective wi
regard to growth of the economy since 1952, an examination of
the attitudes of the Japanese people with regard to businei
the current laws, management personnel, political-economic
structure and business groupings will be made* Such an effort
will involve an analysis of not only the longer range effects
of the occupation's democratization actions, but will also lead
to a conclusion, as presented in the subsequent chapter, w:
regard to the very existence of the zalbatsu within the frame





In order to provide a background for understanding of
current Japanese business practices , selected economic
statistical data are examined to describe the scope and volume
of production* These data will provids an indices of growth
and establish the performance of the Japanese economy. To this
end:
1. Chart VIII provides an index of industrial
production in terms of the type of industry and in comparison
to the industry of other nations.
2. Table 21 indicates the value of exports and imports
over a period of years.
3. Chart IX shows a representation of the real, gross
national product (GNP deflated for price level changes) as the
principal indicator of the overall growth of the economy.
There are three basic elements which various
authorities agree serve, for the most part, to explain Japan's
phenominal economic growth since the end of the occupation:
the high response of the Japanese people to a market oriented,
capitalistic economy; the active role of the government in the
creation of an environment conducive to rapid economic growth;
and the ability of the Japanese to assimilate and efficiently
utilize massive amounts of Western technology and managerial
,>ertise.
Since World War II, the Japanese have thrived under the
concepts of a capitalistic economic system of private enter-
prise operating in free ra bs. Both the 'pre-war and post-war
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1959 60 6\ 62 63 64 65 66
Source: Mintsfry of Foreign Affairs, Sfafisfscal Survey of Economy of






growth records indicate that the Japanese did not lack
responsiveness to economic opportunities either internally or
externally. In this respect, the businessmen could be
characterized as oriented toward the pragmatic, but energetic
and restless when it came to looking for new opportunities.
From 1he short review of political-economic history,
it can be concluded that Japan has neither subscribed to nor
adopted Adam Smith's precepts of the "Invisible Hand" whereby
any interfere! ce with free competition by the government was
deemed to be injurious. From the Tokugawa Era, in which a
central authority was first formed, the; government has always
supported and promoted economic development with the ultimate
purpose of building a strong nation. Because of this basic
motivation, the analogy can be drawn that whereas the phrasa.
"h'hat's good for General Motors is good for the country," is
rejected in the U. 3.; "What's good for Mitsui (or Mitsubishi,
or Sumitomo or any of the largest companies) is good for
Japan, " and vice versa, is not only acceptable, but accurate.
Thus, business participates in the bureaucracy and the
bureaucracy participates in business to weld an amalgam that is
stronger than the individual components which go to make it up.
Japan has always been, and today still is, a group-oriented
society. The Western concept of "rugged individualism" is
regarded with a certain ambivalency ; therefore, Anglo-American
economic ideology, promoted during the occupation, has never
really been fully adopted.
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The third factor attributing to Japan's sustained
economic performance has been the ability of the Japanese to
obtain, assimilate and efficiently/effectively utilize Western
technology and managerial experience. Japan was, for many
years, known and criticized as cheap imitators of Western
products. However, it was overlooked that the vast majority
of the Western industrialized nations, including the United
States, began in a similar manner and that such efforts were
greatly facilitated by certain common cross cultural ties—an
advantage Japan has never enjoyed with the West.
The success of imitative reproduction, however, is only
one facet of the economic development. To reinforce this
aspect, the Japanese have added an ability to adapt and improve
Western technology to produce products efficiently and
inexpensively. In the pursuit of knowledge, the country has
been sending young nationals abroad both to study in
universities and to work in overseas businesses. Meanwhile
they have been building their internal technical education
system to a high level. In addition, Japanese businesses havo
procured massive quantities of patents, licensing arrangements,
and foreign technical agreements since the end of the occupa-
tion thereby narrowing the technological gap which existed for
many years.
The post occupation effectiveness of these and many
other factors can be measured in many ways. The foregoing
statistical data has presented it in the context of Industrial
growth j external trade and real GKP. In terms of Japanese
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labor itself, Table 22 indicates that real cash earning rates
(nominal rates adjusted by inflationary percentages) are on the
increase and, although the propensity to consume has increased,
so have savings which serves to help stabilize the economy.
The Political-Economic Structur e and Legislation
On September 1, 1953, the Diet passed an amendment to
the antimonopoly law which reversed both the spirit and the
letter of occupation policy. The most significant changes were
as follows :
1 . Admission of Recession and_Ratlonalization
Cartels.*"
Cartels and other collusive activities
became legal in those cases where the competent
ministry deemed it necessary on the grounds of
averting a recession or for the purpose of
rationalization.
O D.vlr-.ro J.<*». ~ £• O J 1-1- - T -T A n "I .. J J
According to amended article through
16, interlocking directorship, mergers and mutual
stockholdings became legal, except when they
conflicted with Article 9 (prohibition of holding
companies.) or Article 2 (limitation of stockholding
by a financial institution) and when the result
. . . did not limit competition In a market
substantially.
3. Redefinition of Unfair Competition.
Unfair competition and the catch-all clause
of the original Articles 2-7, which read in part
lessening of "competition which is contrary to the
public interests," were amended to apply only in six
specified cases of "unfair business practices."
4 • Total glim i na tion of Two Ac tic
2
Article 5 ""(prohibiting the establishment of
or becoming a party to a monopolistic organization)
and Article 8 "(prevention of substantial disparities
in bargaining power) were deleted in to to from the
act.













































o cd © t3|
i © a d
o ©
P o pi
., © d «
J H. W































OJ LOVO 0-00 ON'
A CV! K> ON NO K > r-l ON
-> iNIAKW irwOvO;
T\ r-f ON r^\ On KN ON IP
A OJ -tf ON f^N <
(O KN OJ OJ vo vjC; 0n-4"|
'O ITiCO lACO K*\ b- K*\|
'












H i -o-^fco irwo H
* t c- t> o e e e
<nj c\J ^ rr\ iA^t -'t ifi
r •{ CM H LA On On 00 I
C-od oj i— oioo ;
C*J ''AH co N---t-.. !
0\0 LAOVO !
OJ -3" -3" tf> ITiV
in O H Cv) K> -4- i
I
. VOvovOVOM
On on on i








The single most important alteration was the first.
Recession cartels were permitted if the supply and demand were
out of equilibrium, prices fell to below production costs due
to oversupply, etc. The rationalization cartel can be defined
in terms of the Japanese word gorll which literally means
"to make it logical, " but which in economic terras means
. . . to adopt a larger unit of production which
increases efficiency (a lower unit cost) when
produced near or at the optimum level of produc-
tion. The common phrase, "catch up with
Western standard of efficiency," is a nontehnical
way of sayi: the same. (Therefore)
. . . the
term
. . .
(can) also be used to mean to make
any aspect of the operation to yield more than
a competitive profit by such means as acquisition^
of a large market share by whatever means « . . . 2
Thus, rationalization agreements could cover such things as the
standardization of specifications and measurements, obsolete
process restrictions, concentration of production of certain
items, joint use of storage and transportation facilities, and
joint purchase of raw materials.
Through the application of the revised law as well as
the passage of other legislation, the government as well as
private industry has moved inexorably toward increased
concentration patterns. Tables 23 and 24 show the growth of
cartels by total number and by type of legislation,
respectively. In addition, Table 25 indicates the number of







NUMBER OP CARTELS "
(in force at the date indicated)
Date Number
March 31, I960 595
March 31, 1961 714
March 31, 1962 868
March 31, 1963 943
March 31, 1964 966
March 31, 1965 993
March 31, 1966 1,079
March 31, 1967 1,037
December 31, 1967 , 00 (
Source: Hosh..i, Business Concentration , p. 70
TABLB 24






Export- Import Transaction Lav
Export Fishery Industry Law
Fishery Production Co-op Law
Law Concerning Temporary
Measures for Price Stabi-
lization of Fertilizer
Law Concerning the Organiza-
tion of Associations of
Small Enterprises
Costal Shipping Co-op Law
Law Concerning Rationaliza-
tion of Environmental
Sanitation and Related Bnt.
Law Concerning the Extension
of the Liquor Tax, Etc.
Law Concerning Temporary
Measures for the Promotion
of the Machinery Industry
To ta 1



































































Mergers by S ize of Cap
.
ta 1
Size of Capital After Merger Fiscal 56-60
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Source; Hoshii, Business Concentration, p. 38.
liberalized laws. A major result of this movement was




.-wave of mergers has created richer
and more powerful industrial groups. These are
beginning to free themselves from their traditional
dependence on banks that today are incapable of the
ever growing requests for financing. 1
To sum up the political-economic relationships, it can
be said that
. „ .
in addition to such "macro" responsibilities
as the governments of all free-enterprise
economic, have come to assume
—
growth, full
^Xasuo Takeyama, "Big Industry Loosening lie J
Ties," Suecesso (International Edition), August',' 1969, p

Ill
employment, stable prices, and a viable balance-
of-pa., bs position--. . . the Japanese govern-
ment -:tly supports particular Industries,
enters into the terms of technological agreements,
advises on desirable prices, promotes changes in
firm size and encourages car telization. i.
Japanese businessmen regard this as an infringe"'
ruent of their rights.^
Manageme nt Personn 3
'
The purge laws of the occupation as they affected
zaibatsu families and their appointees, were only in effect
just short of four years. In 1951, ths Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers authorized the Japanese government to
"review existing ordinances issued in Implementation of (SOAP)
directives . « ., for the purpose of e reiving through
established procedures such modifications as past experience
,2
and the present situation renders necessary and desirable*
By May of that year, no economic purge^s were still under
designation, a.nd in July, the day the Holding Company
Liquidation Commission was dissolved, the designation of
zaibatsu family members was cancelled.
As to the family members, there is some difference of
opinion concerning the effect of the purge. It is, however,
most generally argued by business authorities that these 56
persons never regained the economic power that they either held
individually or as family groups. In short,
Hadley, Antitrust, p. 390.
^Blsson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, p. .179.
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. • * the lives of the former zalbatsu families
changed
. • . as Japan itself had changed.
These individuals did not usually possess
managerial skills or business acumen and were
merely the titular heads of their empires.
They were powerful only in the long tradition
of their "houses" which controlled immei.'
fortunes. Consequently . . . (they) were
totally urprepared to carve their niche in a new
way of life. A few of them retired into a
secluded life of their chosen academic pursuit,
while most . . . became. inactive rentiers.
Observing in 1953 , a Japanese writer
commented, "they (the zalbatsu families) had
to liquidate their real" estate and even their
art collections to survive in the (postwar)
inflation. Several years ago, they becai
Shayozoku (the tribe of the setting; sun)."1
The personnel who were promo tec. to fill the vacancies
created by the purges were, in the main, from the upper-middle
layer of management (e.g., sectional vice-presidents, plant
managers, divisional supervisors, etc.) and were hand picked,
because of their administrative skills and managerial
competence.
Despite the depurge of 1951, relatively only a few of
the prewar executives returned to resua.e active business lives
at their old positions. There were several primary reasons
for this, as expressed below:
First, after the war many corporations
became independent and their top management
consisted now of new and younger executives-
there was little room left for the return of
former corporate leaders (although the majority
. . . did not express a desire to come back);
^-Yaraamura, Economic Policy , pp. 11-12. For a discourse
which is diametrically opposed to this viewpoint, see Cole,
£aMnj^_Societx, pp. 8 3 -84.
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second, a series of sweeping changes in the
corporate environment after the war made theitnow-how of former executives critically
obsolete (e.g.,
: were totally inexperiencedin dealing with labor unions). 1
Of the ones who did return, took up their former positions
while others became consultants, ex officio chairmen, etc.
However, their total numbers were not large enough to reshape
the newer management trend. As an indices of the change in
managerial philosophy, a study of corporations found that
. . .




had the nts (or chairmen of the board)
in early 1952 as they had had at the time of
surrender
. . . ,
and the remaining 31 . . .
appointed new presidents (or chairmen of -the board)
during the same period.
2
in addition, it was found that "the age; of chief officers was
lower. ' "in the 1951-52 period, the president or chairman of
the board was of an average ago of 51. £ years; at war's end,
60.2 years, "
Other than the personnel movements occasioned by the
purges, there were several management changes. By dissolution
of the holding companies and/or liquidation of the stock of
holding companies which were not dissolved, the corporate power
structure was essentially decentralized. Regardless of whether
an individual held stock or not (stock ownership had been a
Komiya, Postwar 3 silo Growth , pp. 234-235.
2 Ibid . . p. 23 f3c
^Hadley, Antitrust, p. 104.
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prerequisite in prewar days), he could now become a member of
management at various administrative levels. In addition, a
1950 major revision to the commercial laws contained provisions
which served to promote the profess ions.lism of corporate
managers, while at the same time decreased the power of the
stockholders. This served to substantially increase the
decision makirg framework within which the managers could
operate.
General Patterns o f Sto ck Ownership
Since the war, changes have occurred in the distribu-
tion of corporate stacks in Japan. Table 26 shows the 1945-
1960 pattern of the share distribution of companies capitalized
for ?50 million and above. In general, it can be surmised that
while the loiij; range effect of U19 occupation resulted in a.
decline in the role of government (with regard to stock), it
unintentionally produced a great increase in the role of
financial institutions, and left individual holdings at much
the same percentage level as they had teen."1 However, the
number of individuals owning more than 100 shares of stock over
selected years has been dramatically increasing on a continuum
since 1946. (Table 27)
Tie Trend Toward IncreasiKp- Oligopoly
Mergers and collaboration agreements have affected
competition, supply and distribution as well as finance. Prom
1 Ibld .. p. 193.
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Table 28 it appears that over the last ten years, the trend
toward oligorolization has Increased, and because of the
increasing liberalized policies, it w3.ll most likely become
more intensified.
The prewar friendly oligopoly situation previously
described still exists although companies of the major groups
still compete in the same markets. Indicative of this
pnliosopiiy was wits nop @n<a.rexiOi.uxiig structure in nitachi,
Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel in 1961, as shown in Table 29.
Finance
With the rapid expansion of the economy, large companies!
in the manufacturing and trading sectors have had to become
more heavily iependent on banks as their primary source of
finances. This choice of alternatives for capital financing
was brought about by Japanese tax laws which allow corporations,
to deduct interest on bank borrowed capital as an expense
whereas the money paid as stock dividends is taxable although,
in fact, it is also an expense to the corporation. The
natural inclination is to borrow from the banks rather than
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economic influence of the commercial banks. However, on the
other hand, this increase in bank power is being offset
because the amount of funds required has risen so sharply that
the top banks cannot afford the whole i at. This situation
has made it possible for big industrial companies to exert
manipulative power by the use of "divide and conquer" tactics.
The movement of firms from and to financial groups in 1967* is
indicative of the general situation (Table 30).
The Sti ucjture_ of m Selec ted Prewa c_^alb3^tsu„. i.Qr ro_up_s
Ow; alp
The pattern of ownership since the occupation has changed
radically. From the conditions enumerated in Chapter II, the
Mitsui Mitsubishi and Sumltorso groups, except i7i minor eases.
are without zalbatsu family holdings aid honsha. The only
ownership feature which is left is the horizontal cross-ties
between companies within each group. Table 31 annotates this
data and shows the percentage of stock owned by the top ten
shareholders and, within that figure, the percentage
controlled by the group itself. In addition, the table also
indicates the cross ownership relation between the leading
group banks and companies within the group.
A study of the table shows that the ownership pattern
for each group has become diffused to the degree that complete
coordination is required if it is desired that a company be
identified as having tsui, Mitsubishi or Sumitomo ownership,

TABLE 30
NUMBER OF FIRMS JOINING OR LEAVING FINANCIAL GROUPS
(1967)
Industrial Bank of Japan















Cent. Bank for Agriculture &
TO ~
x \jx ww t.i.",y
Cent, Bank for Commerce &
Industry
Local Banks
Chuo Trust & Banking
Nippon Trust & Banking
Mutual Banks













































Note: Figures in parentheses denote changes within groups.
Source: "Banlc Affiliations Under Reorganization," The
Oriental Economist. October, 1968, p. 16.
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There is a marked difference between this and oynditiono which
existed in 1946 as shown by Table 2.
In addition to a fragmented ownership base, the main
banks of the -orewar zaibatsu have lost much of their individual.
and combined power as is shown in Table 32.
Intra-Groi d '' h ns and Interlocking P. boratesiTj i ii«i»rJr»iii^Mi .iW . m i iiii ig " Til i . i T m ifrnYi liiiiFrm ii g i mihwmO—«m ".in i«««n» iin iiiiiniT i
With the dissolution of the holding companies,
"presidents' clubs" were forced which held regularly scheduled
meetings of the top executives of selected affiliated firms
and which , by some, are considered as "equivalent to the top
til
level meetings of the former zaibatsu combines.
* • • In the Mitsubishi grouping the presidents
r>-p or 'i -, . • ;.-> the Friday Qlub
(K.V- L j ; in the Sumitomo grouj>ing the heads
of 17 companies are in the White Waters Club
( Hakusu.1 Kai ) . e Mitsui grouping has two such
clubs , fchs~27 member Monday Club (Getsuyo Kai),
and -the more exclusive 17 member Second Thursday
Club (MmgOmJSai). 2
Except for relatively few changes, the companies belonging to
each club are the same companies which were defined as core
companies by SCAP. (They were called "first and second line"
c ompani e s d ur ing tha t period).
Several factors which must be considered before
determining the relative position of the presidents' clubs in
terms of their becoming successor groups to the boards of the
^Yamamura, Economic Policy , p* 1°
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prewar hongha are as follows: First, they are composed of
people who are equals (e.g., company presidents) which is no
small matter to a nation which has only recently escaped from
a rigid social hierarchy. Second. th=y tend to be too big and
are far from being completely cohesive. Last, there is no
structure to compel one of the core companies to adapt a
specific plan or program even when th^re is a consensus of
opinion on the part of the group. Th 3 Oriental Economis t
summed this up when it investigated tie functions of
Mitsubishi's Friday Club J
The Klnyo I serves as a clearing house for
information, also as a consultative organ.
It makes no decisions, and it has no secretarial
machinery. Consequently, it would be erroneous
to believe that the Klnyo Kai exercises the
authority and power formerly wielied by the
n/r . j. ... . . i. j. I tt „ .. - 1 \ -,-,•.- »
«Il)OU.UiSli,X • . . ' ,' , . . . .DUO TJ.- •. 8 J.S
no denying that
. V , (it) does function as an
effective pivot for coordination of group
affiliated activities. 1
Comprehensive and extensive Interlocking directorates,
as illustrated in Table 3, were formerly used to control
combine members. Today, if 1959 Information is correct,
interlocks are relatively sparse (Table 33). In addition.
since appointment and selection of top corporate leaders is no
longer made from, a central point (i.e.
, the honsha), the
interlockatory features no longer have the strength to dominate
as they had in the past.




INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG THE CORE
COMPANIES OF THE MITSUBISHI, MITSUI,
AND SUMITOMO GROUPINGS (1959 DATA)
Part A; Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi Bank Trading's president, director:
kyo .?ire, Marine Insurance s
ob n, director; Meiji Life
Insurance's president, director.
Tokyo Marine, Fire Insurance Meijl Life Insurance's
president, auditor.
M. Heavy Ind. Reorg.
M. Japan Heavy Industries
He Steel











Japan Heavy Industries 1
president, director; Electric 's
vice-president, director.












director; Real Estate's chairman,
director; Rayon $ s president
director.
Trading's president, director;
Real Estate's president, director;
Mining's president, director;
Mining's managing director,











an Steel's president, director;
Mitsui Shipbldg.'s president,
director; Mitsui Shipbldg. g s
director, director.
Taisho Marine, Fire Insurance's
auditor, auditor.
Mitsui Bank's director, chairman.,














director; Sumitomo Metal Ind.'s
president, director; Sumitomo
Bank's president, director;
Sumlt.on;o Trading s president,
auditor.




iMifi flu ii i imum i ii ihp »"irfiiiim m inrirnrnni—r—ri—w~T*~
Although each group faces the same rivals in multiple
sectors of the market as in prewar days, the frequency with
which transactions of buying, selling and borrowing have





shi Heavy Industri es R<;organlzed-
-
among the principal firms from which it buys,
Sumitomo Metal Industries? among the principal
firms to which it sells, Osaka Sho sen-Mi tsui
Shipping,
Mi tst.l. Chemical Indus tries—aiiong principal
firms frcm which it buys, Mitsubishi Trading;
among principal firms to which it sells
Sumitomo Metal Industries.
e>
Sumitomo Metal Indus tries --among principal
firms frcm which it buys, Mitsubishi Trading
and Mitsui & Co.; among principal firms to which
it sells, Mitsui & Co.*
korobi ya^okl (seven times down, eight times up)," 2
lHadley, Antitrust, pp. 255-256.




In the foregoing pages of the last chapter, both the
modern economy and the major elements which serve to make up
the internal business elements of that economy were examined.
In addition, the workings of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and
Sumitomo groi pings were considered in relation to these
elements and to prewar criteria. From this a conclusion can
be drawn as to the long range effects of occupation reforms
and to the existence of the zalbatsu in the Japanese business
world of today.
With respect to the lasting effects of the reforms,
the answer is obviously a dual one
—
yes and no. Today, there
^s no zalbatsa family member prominent in investment or
executive circles. In looking at today's business groupings
among representatives of the major zalbatsu. it has become
clear that th3 organizational structure is different although
some of the same control techniques used in the prewar era are
still being used. Even though the naraes remain the same, the
groupings are loose confederations as opposed to the tightly
knit monolithic units of old. From a situation where core




centralized organization, the reforms have brought these same
corporations into the position of becoming separate viable
units. Company boards are now able to make fundamental
decisions with respect to such things as open discussions,
executive appointments, personnel policies and political
contributions which is markedly different from the combine
period in which, monolithic unity was a product of enforced and
reenforced control via the honsha. Today, those ties of
yesterday are shadows of the past and concerted action rests on
a base of cooperation stemming out of common elements such as
trade names and trademarks as well as the long tradition of
collectivism which has characterized Japanese businesses for
many centuries. Since the current top officers of these
companies had years of experience under the management
and control system where complete emphasis was placed on the
organization as a whole, it is not difficult to see that a
sort of fiakubatsu (school clique) attitude still remains which
is strong enough to form a cohesive factor among equals within
the group.
On the other hand, the reform was not really effective
in breaking market concentrations and preventing cartels which
was the real purpose of the antlmonopoly legislation. The
weak political base of the Fair Trade Commission has enabled
other elements of the government to promote market concentra-
tion and cartelization. The government itself, through loan
and tax advantages, has encouraged large scale mergers. This
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manifestation of Japanese business philosophy clearly
illustrates the fundamental difference in attitudes toward
competition between America and Japan. American competitive
policy reflects a position that extreme market concentration
either from self growth or merger is lot healthy, and
encourages open and competitive markets. In Japan, however,
competition is considered e^ual to "excessive competition"
and, as such, is considered to be inefficient because firms
are so small that they cannot stand u> to cyclical changes or
compete in international trade. With the axis of the Japanese
economy considered to be exports, a low-wage, high profit
policy where the government is active in business, is of
little concern to the citizenry. Although there are valid
counter arguments to this system, the Japanese government and
private business assessments remain the same and are unlikely
to change in the face of the highest sustained economic growth
rate in its history or of any other.
With the change in corporate structure, a new group of
words has arisen to describe the collective businesses.
The current general term for business
groupings in Japanese is keiretsu . which, 1
into its component parts, is "keT ; meaning
broken
lineage, faction, group" and "retsu" meaning
"arranged in order." Used without~"modifying
adjectives, •*• the term usually refers to the
successor groupings of zaibatsu companies, or
other "headless" combines. ... In other words,
keiretsu refers to a conglomerate grouping of
^majors""" with ties to one another of ownership,
credit, management and marketing. The base is
then one of multiple ties, in contrast to other
^Modifying adjectives are such things as k inyu ke Ir e tsu
.
groupings which rest on credit sources; kigyo keiretsu*
groupings which rest on raw material suppliers and/or product
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types of groupings which rest primarily on
one type of linkage. 3-
Another postwar term, zajJj^aJL, has come into favor. It is
defined as "the economic world or economic (financial)
circles c"2 ."n use,
... it practically supersedes zalbatsu .
. . . By inference as well as usage, the new
term connotes big-business power ,$roup. „ . .
More inclusive than zaibatsu. it is never- the
-
less restricted to big business. In journalistic
usage, i ; more often than not refers to the leaders
of big business, particularly those who have the
support .)f the powerful economic organizations.
Zaikai also denotes the place where the craving
for political power is openly expressed and
gratified-- that hypothetical arena in which big
business influences the government ... by the
collective strength and unified will" of its
economic organizations.^
.
This, the conclusion can be drawn that although the
companies for the most part still exist, the older ; Ibatsu
per se no longer exists, but has been replaced by kelretsu
in the busln3ss world and zaikai in the political-economic
sphere. However, there is a dark side to the picture, as
pointed out by Eleanor Hadley:
finishers; shihon keiretsu . a subsidiary group which rests on
capital and~where parent company ownership is high, manage-
ment interlocks numerous and credit extension frequent; and
kombinato« groupings which rest on technically related
products where the output of company's plant is the raw
material input for another and where transportation costs
range from high to prohibitive.
^Hadley, Antitrust , p. 257.
2Kenkyusha t s New Japanese-Bnglish Dictionary , p. 2044,
•^Yanaga Ohitoshi, Big; Business In Japanese Politics
(Hew Haven: Yale University PressT" 1968), p. 32.
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While government favors— credit, tax or
otherwise—may greatly facilitate the performance
of the economy, to which the postwar Japanese
economy is clearly brilliant testimony, there is
a price to be paid for this manner of operation.
... In Japan's past, the partiality of
government favors was a major contributory factor
to the development of the zalbatsu.
. . .
Political history, including Japanese history,
provides many illustrations of the unfortunate
political consequences of (economic) concentration. -*
This latter view is particularly appropriate at this
time. Emerging large organizations, such as the current Toyota
Group, show every single facet of the old zalbatsu in their
organizations with the one exception of the f inancial/banklng
ties. If these businesses develop in the same manner as in
the past, it is only a question of ti.ne before there will be
power.ful group bants emerging, and with the banks will come
more market concentration.
The problem, the warning, and the potential outcome
are all succinctly and beautifully stated in the word picture
drawn by the seventeen-syllable Japanese poetry called
haiku«-
When the tight string
snapped, the kite fell
fluttering
. . . then . . .
It lost its spirit. 2
^adley, Antitrust, pp. 454-, 406-407.
.
2Haiku Harvest , trans, by Peter Beilenson and Harry


























A clerk, usually the chief clerk
Bureaucracy of th-3 Tokugawa era
Merchant class
Korea
Local lords of the Tokugawa era
Monopoly capital
School clique
Mitsui ! s Monday Club
I Aj_j,j. I/CIA y ljAAi|«ti v/ !. uj.^-j.j. \j'-*j. J.a vo
Sumitomo's White Waters Club
Current Japanese syllabary
Head holding company of a combine
Head family holding company of a combine
Official clique or bureaucracy
Japanese ideographic script
Current Japanese syllabary
Family system or organization
Current term for business groupings
Mitsubishi's Friday Club


























Society of the Black Dragon
Quasi-war time economy
Political term referring to the
"Democratic Associates Party"
Mitsui's Second Ihursday Club
Bank of Japan
Japanese Mail Steamship Company
Peasant class
Rice wine
Society of the Charry
Warrior
Political term referring to the




Imperial Rule Assistance Association
Wholesale establishment
Army "Control Group" faction of the 1930s
Huge politically and economically
powerful combines usually family
dominated and tightly controlled
through management and financial
interlocks
Zaikai Economic or financial circles

APPENDIX II
THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF THE ANTIMONOpOLI LAW
Chapter I, Article 2: Defined such terms as "entrepreneur,"
"competition," "private monopolization," etc. Also defined
the perameters of the terra "unfair methods of competition"
as :
(1) undue price discrimination in the "supplying of
commodities, funds and other economic benefits."
(2) "supplying of commodities, funds and other
economic bensf its at undue low prices .
"
(3) stealing of a competitor's customers by
unreasonably "inducing or coercing ... by means of offering
benefits or that of threatening disadvantages."
(4) "unwarranted refusal to receive from or supply to
other entrepreneurs commodities, funds and other economic
benefits.
"
(5) maintaining exclusive or sole agency contracts.
(6) forcing selection of officers in other companies
Chapter II: Dealt with private monopolies and "unreasonable
restraints of trade."
Article 4: prohibited participation in price fixing;
restricting output, "technology, proc.ucts, markets, . . .
customers, . . . construction or expansion of facilities."
Article 5 •' prohibited participation in associations
which controlled the flow of products' or materials (internal
cartels or monopolies).
Article 6: prohibited participation in international
cartels.
Chapter III: Dealt with "substantial disparities in bargaining
power."
Article 8: directed that the Pair Trade Commission
(FTC) could, when founded, order the transfer of "a part of
(the) business facilities" or "take z.ny other necessary
measure" to eliminate "disparities in .bargaining power if it
was not based upon "technological grounds."
Chapter IV: Detailed restrictions on such things as "stock
holdings, multiple directorates, mergers and (the) transfer





Article 9: prohibited holding companies which were
defined as "a company whose principal business is to control,
by holding stocks, the business activities of another company
Article 10: prohibited the acquisition or possession
of stock in another company by nonfinancial firms which would
restrict competition unless horizontal integration was
justified on technological grounds.
Article 10: prohibited the acquisition or possession
of stock in another company by nonfinancial firms which would
restrict competition unless hlrisontai integration was
justified on technological grounds.
Article 11: prohibited financial firms from owning
more than 5 percent of the stock of any other single
enterprise, cither industrial or financial, and also
prohibited the purchase of stock in competing firms.
Article 13: prohibited interlocking directorates in
competing floras and provided certain other restrictions to
noncompetlng firms under the same ownership.
Chapter V: ])ealt with "unfair methods of competition."
Chapter VI: Dealt with exemptions to the law.
Chapter VIII: Set up the Pair Trade Commission (FTO).
Chapter IX: Dealt with court appeals from FTC rulings.
Chapter X: Provided for penalties.

APPENDIX III
EACT0P3 WITHIN THE DECOJS ^ TRATION LAW TO BE USED
FOE DETERMINATION QE
I ESIVE CONCENTRATIONS
1. Percentage of amount of production or other
economic activity ... to the total production capacity or
total amount of other economic activity.
2. Comparison of present production capacity in
Japan proper with maximum capacity in Japan proper on or
prior to Juno 30, 1937, of any enterprise.
3. Comparison of percentage 3f present production
capacity or amount of other economic activity
. . . of any
enterprise to the total production capacity or total amount
of other economic activity ... in tie respective field of
activity.
4. Relationship of control over other enterprises.
5. "he number, location and sther geographic
conditions of plants operated by any enterprise.
6. JThether plants are inter-rela ted in productive
processes and extent of such interrelation in use of raw
materials, products produced or in markets for products.
• 7. Control of raw materials by any enterprise.
8. History of expansion of business activity by
gar of Independent enterprise or other means,means of mer^
9. Comparison of the efficiency of production of
any enterprise with the efficiency of its separated parts
or combination of separate parts.
10. Participation of any enterprise in or the
existence of any arrangement
. . . which provides for special
privileges in the purchase or sale of materials, restrictions
upon production or distribution, fixing prices, restrictions
upon business or sales areas, or the exclusive exchange of
patents or technical information.
11. Control over substantial business activity
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